THE STATE OF MURDER IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES
A STORY OF SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND
POLICE GEOGRAPHY

DAVID U. SOCOL DE LA OSA*

Japan has uncovered a competitive advantage in murder
prevention strategies, as murder rates in the nation are some of the
lowest in the world. In Japan, murder rates have been falling
consistently since the post-World War II era to reach rates of 0.2
murders per 100,000 people, whereas in the United States these rates
have been historically volatile, stabilizing in recent decades slightly
above 5 murders per 100,000 people. This study poses the following
questions: What structural, sociolegal, and policy elements have
made Japan reach such positive results in murder prevention? And
what lessons can be learned from this success that may help reduce
murder rates in the United States? Analyzing the state of murder in
Japan and the United States, this Paper provides a comparative
examination of some of the structural factors affecting the
geographical and perpetrator elements of murder. Through the lens
of (i) socioeconomic indicators like inequality, poverty, and
unemployment, as well as (ii) the geographical allocation of police
resources (comparing the United States police infrastructural
arrangement with the Japanese koban system), this Paper attempts
to shine light on the structural patterns that have made Japanese
society such a profoundly safe environment from homicide.
Avoiding purely holistic or monolithic culturalist arguments, the
Paper looks at the historical trajectory of murder at a national level,
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then provides a contemporary state of murder analysis of Boston as
compared to Osaka, and New York in contrast to Tokyo. Dispelling
the notion that a larger police force with larger capital investment
equates safety from murder, the study finds that (i) areal
socioeconomic integration, and (ii) equal geographic distribution of
police resources as community-focused and integrated safety
providers, are two of the foundational distinct elements that lead to
murder prevention in Japan—and that a tailored adaptation of this
system to the United States’ needs, capabilities, and characteristics
could signify increased efficiency in murder prevention, and a
consequent reduction in murder rates.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Japan’s murder rates have been consistently falling since World
War II, to the point that the Land of the Rising Sun is one of the safest
countries in the world, with some of the lowest murder rates.1 This
raises a number of compelling legal and policy questions: Why are
there so few murders in Japan? What are the legal and policy
structures that have contributed to a constant decline in murder
rates throughout the nation’s recent history? How can we better
understand the elements that define its model so that we can imitate
its success? In endeavoring to answer these questions and those that
may derive from them, this Paper conducts a comparative analysis
between murder rates in the United States and Japan, first
addressing national tendencies, and then changing the focus of the
study to specific cities. Observing the comparatively low number of
murders in Japan with the rest of the world in general, and the
United States in particular, this Paper intends to reveal potential
patterns behind the Nippon nation’s continued success in murder
prevention, and in understanding the underlying socioeconomic
and legal factors that lead to it, formulate functional policy
recommendations for the United States. The thesis scrutinizes the
relationship between murder as a legal and policy issue and (i)
socioeconomic factors, with a specific concentration on inequality
indexes, unemployment, and poverty, and (ii) police presence and
the geographical allocation of its resources. The focused analysis is
geography-based and it adjusts its lens first at a national scope,
pursuing a historical socioeconomic analysis of the state of murder
1
INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL PEACE INDEX: MEASURING PEACE IN A
COMPLEX WORLD (2019), http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/07/
GPI-2019web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EQ8-BKUE]; see also Japan, OECD BETTER
LIFE
INDEX,
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/japan/
[https://perma.cc/W8VP-RHAH] (last visited June. 15, 2020) (“The homicide rate
(the number of murders per 100 000 inhabitants) is a more reliable measure of a
country's safety level because, unlike other crimes, murders are usually always
reported to the police. According to the latest OECD data, Japan's homicide rate is
0.2, the lowest rate in the OECD, where the average homicide rate is 3.7.”). The
data analysis and policy formulations presented throughout this Paper were
gathered and generated prior to the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. For example, though
unemployment may have increased in the United States as a direct result to Covid19 and its consequent regulatory reactions, lockdown and other shelter-in-place
policies may interact differently with murder rates than prior freedom of movement
policies would. All in all, this Paper does not intend to make claims with respect to
the influence of the Covid-19 pandemic on murder rates, and how other indicators
may respond to or network with socioeconomic elements.
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commencing in the post-war era; and then pursuing a narrower
examination at a city-level, offering contemporary comparative
reviews of the state of murder in Boston and Osaka as well as New
York and Tokyo.
The Paper is configured as a critique of Braga, Papachristos, and
Hureau’s high-crime micro-units thesis of crime (or crime “hot
spots”). 2 This theory presents two inferences derived from
observations gathered from the city of Boston’s crime data: (i) most
homicides occur within specific highly concentrated areas (microunits), and (ii) most murders are and will be executed by a highly
limited group of people with high rates of recidivism.3 The hot spots
thesis is founded upon the premise of predictive analytics. Through
observing the past geolocation of murders, it attempts to predict and
map the future of nonnegligent killings. By utilizing predictive
geospatial modeling, the hot spot theory hopes to allocate police and
other resources more efficiently, distributing them according to the
anticipated crime locations. This Paper intends to analyze, first,
whether the micro-unit model has value beyond being a description
of Boston’s murder landscape, and second, whether it can be
applicable cross-culturally. It does so by comparing murders in the
city of Boston with those of Osaka, and for contrastive control, New
York with Tokyo. Further, building upon the findings of the
comparative analysis, this Paper will offer policy recommendations
for the prevention of murder in the United States.
2.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MURDER IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
A Tale of Murder and the Economy—By the Numbers

The histories of murder in the United States and Japan are
profoundly different. Though nominally similar in their point of
origin, as both nations shared comparable murder rates during the
beginning of the twentieth century, at some point the path of these
2 See generally Anthony A. Braga et al., The Concentration and Stability of Gun
Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 1980-2008, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 26, 3353 (2010).
3 See discussion infra Section 3.1 (establishing murders as a consequence to
gun violence, and gun violence being a remarkably concentrated phenomenon per
Braga et al.’s data-centered conclusions).
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nations diverged to the vastly different states of murder seen today.
While Japanese murder rates have fallen steadily throughout recent
history since World War II, murder rates in the United States have
been near-perpetually volatile—though subject to a tendential
decline within the most recent decades.
What are the
socioeconomic, legal, or policy indicators behind Japan’s steady
decline and U.S. volatility? Are there any discernible patterns that
may inform or affect murder in these two countries beyond
nebulous culturalist explanations? To attempt to answer these
questions and understand the suitability of the high-crime microunit thesis in both nations, it is necessary to lay a historical
foundation that may create a cohesive and data-driven narrative for
the evolution and present state of murder rates in both countries
since the post-war era. A preliminary methodological step is to
evaluate and communalize an operational definition regarding how
Japan and the United States legally categorize murder within their
respective legal structures.
The United States defines murder as the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice. 4 It is the qualifying element of
intentionality that distinguishes murder from other forms of killing
(like manslaughter), and the absence of a justification (like selfdefense), that renders the act unlawful. 5 Japan, very closely
ascribing to these legal parameters, defines murder as homicide
with intent. However, in statistically codifying murder data,
Japanese police include counts of attempted murders (which
amount to about half of Japan’s archived aggregate murder count),
and do not include murders connected to robberies, or assaults that,
unintentionally, conclude with death (“robbery murders” and
“lethal assaults,” respectively). Such robbery murders and lethal

4 Murder--Definition and Degrees, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
jm/criminal-resource-manual-1536-murder-definition-and-degrees
[https://perma.cc/UNX7-9WK7] (last updated Jan. 17, 2020); Manslaughter Defined,
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1537manslaughter-defined [https://perma.cc/NS5Z-WJQE] (last updated Jan. 17,
2020). For the data in this Paper (collected mainly from the FBI, the Boston P.D.,
and the New York P.D.), the definitions fall within the parameters of “nonnegligent
manslaughter as the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another,”
as determined by police investigation. Murder, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/murder
[https://perma.cc/9D8Z-599E] (defining murder under the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program).
5
See Murder, FBI: UCR, supra note 4 (defining justifiable homicides).
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assaults generally account for 10-15% of all killings. 6 With a
definitional common ground demarcated, the Paper will proceed to
a country-focused analysis of murder rates, and their
interrelationship with socioeconomic elements, commencing with
an examination of the contemporary history of murder in the United
States.
In 2017, in the United States, there were a total of 17,284
murders—a rate of 5.3 murders per 100,000 people. 7
In
contemporary history, U.S. murder rate trends have stabilized
between 4 and 6 cases per 100,000. However, this is just the story of
the two most recent decades (2000s and 2010s). 8 The broader
historical trajectory of murder rates in the United States tells a
different tale—one of almost constant fluctuation. For the first half
of the twentieth century, murder rates escalated from averages
below 3 murders per 100,000 individuals during the century’s first
decade, to 5 murders per 100,000 throughout the 1920s, to peaks of
over 10 murders per 100,000 during the late 1920s and early 1930s
(coinciding with the Great Depression). Eventually, murder rates
dropped sharply during the pre-war era, to stabilize at averages of
under 6 murders per 100,000 individuals in the years immediately
following World War II.9 Casting a more focused inquiry into postwar United States, during the 1950s, murder rates rested at values of
4, and during the early 1960s closer to 5 per 100,000 people once
6
KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 199, 205, 240 (Japan), amended by Act No. 54 of 2007;
Mariko Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, Homicide by Men in Japan, and its Relationship to Age,
Resources and Risk Taking, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 332, 333-34 (2005).
7 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, FBI: UCR, https://www.ucr
datatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm
[https://perma.cc/TUW28NCS]; see also U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics
database, Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 people)–United States, Japan, THE WORLD
BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=US-JP
[https://perma.cc/P2YA-2CGY] (last visited June 11, 2020) [hereinafter Intentional
Homicides].
8 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7.
9
See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7; JUSTICE RESEARCH
& STATISTICS ASS’N, CRIME AND JUSTICE ATLAS 2000, at 38 (2000), https://static.prison
policy.org/scans/Crime_Atlas_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT2J-WBRU]; Ted
Robert Gurr, Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical Review of the Evidence, 3
CRIME & JUST. 295, 295-353 (1981); Randolph Roth, Criminologists and Historians of
Crime: A Partnership Well Worth Pursuing, 21 CRIME, HIST., & SOCIETIES 389, 389-401
(2017). This paper does not pursue exhaustive or specific inquiries related to preWWII era murder rates. This narrative account is given for general background
purposes only.
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again.10 Yet, in the late 1960s, murder rates grew significantly and
continued to ascend throughout the early 1970s and 1980s.11 During
these two decades, the United States’ murder rates oscillated at their
peak around 10 murder cases per 100,000 individuals, with the two
decades finding an equilibrium just below rates of 9.12 The 1990s
brought a downwards trend in murder rates, a reduction that would
see the ratios contract from over 9 at the beginning of the decade, to
below 6 murders per 100,000 individuals at its conclusion.13 This
undeviating decline would be continuous until a stabilization
period throughout the 2000s with rates that stayed in the mid-5
range—averaging 5.52 murders per 100,000 individuals for the
decade.14 Currently, the United States seems to be in a period of
relative stability with a slight uncertainty in its directionality. The
murder rate in 2018 of 5.0 murders per 100,000 individuals was
down from the rates in 2017 (5.3) and 2016 (5.4), but up from those
in 2015 (4.9) and 2014 (4.4). 15 2014 was the year with the least
documented murders in the United States since the FBI database
started recording this data in 1960, marking the bottom of a trough
which had started in 1991, when murder rates ascended to 9.8, and
then fell almost steadily since—save for the aforementioned
stabilization during the 2000s which included slight transitionary
increases. 16 In fact, the 2010s have been America’s safest decade
according to murder cases in FBI-recorded history. The 2010s had
an average rate of 4.85 murders per 100,000 individuals, a stark
10
See James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
Homicide
Trends
in
the
U.S.
(Homicide
victimization,
1950-2005),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CW3FE4A8]; CRIME AND JUSTICE ATLAS 2000, supra note 9, at 38 (2000).
11 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7.
12 Id.
13 Id; Intentional Homicides, supra note 7.
14
See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7; Intentional
Homicides, supra note 7. According to the FBI database, the standard deviation for
the 2000s murder rates was the lowest in history. The 1990s saw the most abrupt
yearly divergence rates.
For more information on general standard
deviation/volatility, see discussion infra note 18.
15
See Crime in the United States, 1999-2018, FBI: UCR,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-1
[https://perma.cc/XG3S-BEWC].
16 Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 19912010, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.2010/tables/10tbl01.xls [https://perma.cc/E9P8-Y49W]. See also discussion infra
note 18.
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contrast with the 1970s, which suffered the highest rates at 8.97 (with
a peak average between 1978 and 1982 of 9.58), and below America’s
comprehensive historic average, which is presently anchored at 6.95
murders per 100,000.17 In essence, the United States’ state of murder
is one characterized by general volatility, 18 a tendential relative
decline throughout the most recent decades, and a slight uptick in
the most recent years.
Economically, the trends are quite disparate amongst the
different selected indicators of inequality, unemployment, and
poverty.
Inequality follows its own path, while trends in
unemployment and poverty coincide and travel parallel to those of
murder rates. As to the first indicator, inequality indexes in the
United States have followed an almost entirely linear upwards
trajectory throughout recent history, tabulating at a 0.415 Gini (a
standard measure of wealth distribution, where 1 is absolute
inequality and 0 is absolute equality) in 2016.19 Inequality during
the 1970s was significantly lower than it is presently, sitting in the
mid 0.3 ratio during the entire decade.20 The two most significant
observable increases in inequality in the United States have occurred
(i) during the beginning of the 1980s, jumping from 0.346 Gini in
1979 to 0.375 in 1986 (an 8.38% increase in 7 years); and (ii) during
the early 1990s, growing from 0.382 in 1991 to 0.402 in 1994 (a 5.2%
increase in 3 years).21 Because of the linear and progressive increase
in inequality, it is difficult to find a connection at a macroeconomic
national level between inequality (which has grown consistently)
and murder rates (which have been subject to abrupt variations,
seemingly disconnected from the constant increase in economic
inequality).

See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7.
The standard deviation of U.S. murder rates between 1960 and 2018 is
approximately 6.12% (an average of arithmetic standard deviation of 0.061195882,
and logarithmic standard deviation of 0.060624622), rendering the annualized
historical volatility in this 58-year-period 46.62%. All calculations have been made
utilizing FBI’s U.C.R. data.
19
See Gini Index (World Bank estimate)–United States, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2016&locations=US&st
art=1974&view=chart [https://perma.cc/68EB-67WQ].
20
Id.
21 Id.
17
18
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Unemployment indicators, on the other hand, seem to share
direct correlative mirroring with murder rates. 22 In 2019,
unemployment reached a historic low of approximately 4% in the
United States, following a continuous descent since the 2008
economic crisis, after rates of 5% in 2016, 8% in 2012, and 10% in
2009. 23 Unemployment rates in the United States—like murder
rates—increased sharply during the 1970s, reaching a peak of 9%
labor inactivity in 1975 before decreasing slightly, accompanied
accordingly throughout by equally oscillating murder rates.24 This
modest decline in both unemployment and murder rates during the
late 1970s would then revert, cresting above 10% unemployment
during 1983 and 1984, accompanied again by historic highs in
murder rates—above 10 murders per 100,000 individuals.25 After
the early 1980s increase which would present summits in both
unemployment and murder rates, there would be another slight
reduction, with a low of 5.3% unemployment in 1989, which would
last until another increase during the early 1990s—again mirroring
murder rates. 26 Minor fluctuations ensued after this point, but a
relative balance was found between 4 and 6% unemployment rates
22
A geographically-focused state-by-state linear regression analysis
regarding murder-counts in 2018 reveals the correlation coefficient between state
unemployment rates and homicides is r=0.47749, p=0.0005; and an areal linear
regression analysis between state poverty and homicide r=0.69928, p=0.000000016.
Homicide Mortality by State, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/homicide_mortality/homicide.
htm [https://perma.cc/2JRK-4NFZ]; Unemployment Rates for States Annual Average
Rankings 2012-Present, R.I. DEP’T LAB. & TRAINING, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/
lmi/laus/us/annavg.htm [https://perma.cc/DJ78-BKD9]; Percent of Total
Population in Poverty, 2018, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://data.ers.usda.gov/
reports.aspx?ID=17826 [https://perma.cc/J6ZQ-793A].
23
Press Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The
Employment Situation—April 2019 (May 3, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/empsit_05032019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y7W-PLXU]; see
also Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to
2019), U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU
04000000?periods=Annual+Data&periods_option=specific_periods&years_option
=all_years [https://perma.cc/42EQ-LAB5]; Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/help/
one_screen/ln.htm [https://perma.cc/8CLF-78SD] (last modified Feb. 20, 2018);
ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 19802008, DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ DOC. NO. 236018 (2011).
24 See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from
1960 to 2019), supra note 23.
25 See Id.; State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7.
26 See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from
1960 to 2019), supra note 23; State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7.
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(accompanied by murder rate stabilization), followed by another
surge in 2008, which would leave the country with above 9% laborinactive population.27 After the 2008 economic crisis, the country
entered an era of labor recuperation, and unemployment rates have
steadily decreased to the rates seen today. There is currently around
4% total unemployment in the United States. 28 It is directly
observable that these unemployment fluctuations seem to go almost
hand in hand with murder rates.29 This correlation is such that it has
attracted the attention of academia, establishing unemployment
rates as a strong predictive tool for murder rates in the United
This Paper, however, intends to steer clear of
States. 30
monolithically holistic answers to the questions posed by murder
rates and, though noting the significant and valid relationship
between unemployment and murder, seeks further comprehension
of the data in pursuit of policy recommendations that exceed that of
merely reducing unemployment.
Having briefly examined inequality and unemployment’s
relationship with murder rates in the United States generally, this
27 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Employment Situation—April 2019, supra note 23;
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 2019),
supra note 23.
28 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Employment Situation—April 2019, supra note 23;
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 2019),
supra note 23.
29 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Employment Situation—April 2019, supra note 23.
See also Crime in the United States, FBI, supra note 15; Databases, Tables & Calculators
by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 2019), supra note 23; State and
National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7.
30 Scott J. South & Lawrence E. Cohen, Unemployment and the Homicide Rate: A
Paradox Resolved?, 17 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 325 (1985); see also Steven Raphael &
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON.
259 (2001); Matthew D. Melick, The Relationship Between Crime and Unemployment, 11
PARK PLACE ECON. 30 (2003); Jeff Grabmeier, Higher Crime Rate Linked to Low Wages
and Unemployment, Study Finds, OHIO ST. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2002),
https://news.osu.edu/higher-crime-rate-linked-to-low-wages-andunemployment-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/WG7U-YF67]; Matthew R. Lee,
Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Homicide, 41 SOC. Q. 189 (2000); Robert Nash Parker,
Poverty, Subculture of Violence, and Type of Homicide, 67 SOC. FORCES 983 (1989); Maia
Szalavitz, The Surprising Factors Driving Murder Rates: Income Inequality and Respect,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/08/
income-inequality-murder-homicide-rates [https://perma.cc/2X67-8XJB]; Alan
Burdziak, Experts Say Connection Between Crime and Poverty is Complex, COLUMBIA
TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.columbiatribune.com/51c865d8-9d32-58b9b691-a52dcf6dff48.html [https://perma.cc/DY6H-7M3J].
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Paper
will proceed to examine another of the selected
socioeconomic indicators: the potential connection between poverty
and murder rates at a national level. Relative poverty rates in the
United States have remained relatively stable throughout the
analyzed eras, with fluctuations between 11 and 15% (and usually
resting between 12 and 14%). In 2018, poverty rates stood at 12.3%.31
Just as unemployment accompanies the oscillations in murder rates,
a macroeconomically-focused approach to poverty follows a similar
trajectory with contiguous peaks and valleys. Poverty rates were at
their minimum and most invariable during the 1970s, with the
lowest percentage taking place in 1973 at 11.1%. 32 These rates
remained stable until the late stages of the 1970s, steadily increasing
and peaking in 1983 at 15.2%, just as murder rates (and
unemployment) peaked as well. 33 Poverty rates then decreased
consistently to reach a rate of 12.7% in 1989, and escalated again to
15.1% in 1994, coinciding once more with an escalation in the
number of murders in the nation. 34 After this peak, the decrease
remained steady through the 2000s with said stability being
reflected in murder rates as well, until the 2008 economic crisis,
which would present significant financial and socioeconomic
backlash coinciding with an ascent to a 15.1% poverty rate in 2010.35
It is apparent in this regard that, macroeconomically and at a
national level, poverty and unemployment in the United States
mirror each other, and they both correlate strongly with murder,
whereas inequality has maintained an independent and continuous
ascent—rendering it a non-factor at a macro-geographical national
level.
Japan presents a structurally distinct state of murder from that
of the United States—both in terms of quantity of murder and
historical variance. In Japan, murder rates are, overall, significantly
lower than those of the United States. In 2016, when the United
31
Kayla Fontenot et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the United
States: 2017, Doc. No. P60-263 (Sept. 2018), https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-263.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UXY2-LP55]. See Poverty Rate (Indicator), ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION
&
DEV.,
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm
[https://perma.cc/S24R-WZLS]; Japan’s Worsening Poverty Rate, NIPPON.COM (Sept.
24, 2014), https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00072/ [https://perma.cc/
VN99-B4GU].
32 Fontenot et al., supra note 31.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35
Id.
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States faced 17,413 murders with a rate of 5.4 per 100,000 people,36
Japan only had 362 murders in total, for a rate of 0.28 murders per
100,000 individuals. 37 These rates are not uncommon in Japan, a
country in which the number of murders has a history of yearly
decrease since the post-war era. While the United States has
stabilized within the last decade at averages near 5 murders per
100,000 individuals, Japan has diminished from averages of 0.6
during the 1990s, to 0.5 during the 2000s, to less than 0.4 on a
consistent (and diminishing) basis—culminating in a 0.2 murder
rate in 2017.38 Japan also exhibits a much more stable overall trend
than the United States—U.S. murder rates fluctuate and shadow
unemployment and poverty rates, while Japan follows a stable
downward trajectory without severe alterations upwards and
disconnected from socioeconomic influxes.
Historically, prior to World War II and throughout most of the
first quarter of the twentieth century, Japan’s murder rates varied
between averages of 3 and 4.5 murders per 100,000 individuals;
standards that would drop dramatically during the mid-1930s to
reach a valley of rates slightly over 1 murder per 100,000
individuals, stabilizing again above 3.5 in the decade immediately
following the war.39 However, since the post-war period, and with
particular intensity since the mid-1950s, the homicide rate has
decreased at a steady and constant pace. From the 1960s to the
1980s, the murder rate undeviatingly fell from 2 per 100,000 to 1.40
See Crime in the United States, FBI, supra note 15.
See Intentional Homicides, supra note 7.
38
Id.
39
Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra note 6, at 332, 334, 336; UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
DRUGS
AND
CRIME,
GLOBAL
STUDY
ON
HOMICIDE
(2013),
ON
https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BO
OK_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QJN-Y3U5]; David T. Johnson, Crime and
Punishment in Contemporary Japan, 36 CRIME AND JUST. 371 (2007); Thomas Ellis &
Koichi Hamai, Homicide in Japan, in THE HANDBOOK OF HOMICIDE 388 (Fiona
Brookman et al. eds., 2017); Satoru Kiire et al., 日本における連続殺人事件の類型と
単一殺人事件との比較 [Classification of Serial Homicide and Comparison of Serial
Homicide with Single Homicide in Japan], 87(6) JAPANESE J. PSYCHOL. 633 (2017),
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jjpsy/87/6/87_87.15228/_article/-char/ja/
[https://perma.cc/VW2Y-PC2D]; JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUST., 昭和４３年版 犯罪
白書 第三編/第三編 [WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, PART III STATISTICAL TABLE] (1968),
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/9/nfm/n_9_3_1_1_0_0.html#H003001-1H
[https://perma.cc/D8R3-UAWV] (showing the number of arrest of homicide
suspects from 1876 to 1967); discussion supra note 20 (delineating the Paper’s
historical analysis past WWII).
40 See Intentional Homicides, supra note 7.
36
37
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Since then, rates have only continued to decrease stably throughout
the decades.41 In essence, Japan’s murder rates enjoy a continuous
decline since the post-World War II era—a fall that is disconnected
from socioeconomic deviations and influences.
Economically, as mentioned above, Japanese murder rates do
not seem to have a conditional relationship with fluctuations in
inequality, unemployment, or poverty, thus presenting a structural
difference with the United States, where the data appears to suggest
strong connections between socioeconomic indicators and murder
rates. Inequality in Japan is comparatively less significant than that
of the United States, and, unlike in the United States, it does not
trend exclusively upwards.42 Between 1985 and 2000, Gini indexes
reflected an increase from 0.304 to 0.337. 43 However, by 2003
inequality measurements decreased to 0.321.44 Between 2003 and
2009, there was another increase, which would leave the index
standing at 0.336. This uptick was followed by another decrease in
2012, seeing numbers return to 0.33.45 Between 2009 and 2013, while
the United States exhibited an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.453,
Japan sustained an average of 0.329. 46 Hence, while the United
41
The only exceptions have been (i) a slight increase from 0.45 in 2007 to 0.51
in 2008 (from 574 to 654 total murders, coinciding with the economic recession) to
continue the downward trend in following years (506 total murders in 2009, 465 in
2010, 442 in 2011, 429 in 2012); (ii) from 370 in 2013 to 395 in 2014, to continue the
downward trend in following years (363 in 2015, 362 in 2016); and (iii) from 306
total murders in 2017 to 334 in 2018. See Victims of intentional homicide, 1990-2018,
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME https://dataunodc.un.org/content/
data/homicide/homicide-rate [https://perma.cc/5ZEB-JJ6E].
42 Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://data.
oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm
[https://perma.cc/N95S-VKDW]
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019); see also THE ATLAS OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN 6
(Tomoki Nakaya & Yuri Ito eds., 2019).
43 See Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 42;
THE ATLAS OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN, supra note 42.
44 See Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 42;
THE ATLAS OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN, supra note 42.
45
Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.; THE ATLAS OF
HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN, supra note 42; see generally Mitsumaru Kumagai et
al., Japan’s Economy: Monthly Review, DAIWA: INST. RES. (Oct. 21, 2016).
46 See Toshiaki Aizawa, Robert Dekle & Matthias Helble, Sources of Income
Inequality: A Comparison of Japan and the United States 4 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst.,
Working Paper No. 663, Feb. 2017), https://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/228471/adbi-wp663.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GBP5BXMQ]; see generally FREDERICK SOLT, THE STANDARDIZED WORLD INCOME
INEQUALITY DATABASE, VERSION 8 (2019).
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States’ wealth disparity continues to soar, unequal distribution of
wealth in Japan is not only (i) comparatively smaller, but (ii) exhibits
elements of cyclicality, and (iii) appears disconnected from
progressively diminishing murder rates.
Unemployment in Japan has also remained relatively stable,
oscillating between rates of 1 and 3%.47 In 2019, the unemployment
rate rested at 2.5%, 48 consistent with professional inactivity
historical rates. The exception to this stability occurred during the
1990s, a time that historians and experts on Japan have referred to
as “the lost decade,” an economic period in which the Japanese
economy stagnated, halting its previous meteoric growth.49 Before
that, throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, unemployment
percentages in post-war Japan stood between 1 and 2%.50 During
the 1970s, unemployment stabilized with figures between 2 and 3%,
and though unemployment rose, murder rates kept their steady
decline. 51 As previously mentioned, the rupture to Japan’s
continuous economic prosperity arrived during the 1990s—an era in
which unemployment would increase, but murders would continue
their inexorable decline. The lost decade would bring with it a
steady increase in unemployment, peaking in the early 2000s above
5%.52 After this cycle, there was a slight period of recuperation, and
the rates fell again to around 3.5%.53 However, this recuperation
47
Unemployment, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://data.
oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm [https://perma.cc/GE54-S6HU] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2019; see also Japan Unemployment Rate (1953-2020 Data),
TRADINGECONOMICS, https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/unemployment-rate
[https://perma.cc/4VLV-KCHD].
48 Unemployment, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 47; see also
Japan Unemployment Rate (1953-2020 Data), supra note 47.
49 See generally Tamin Bayoumi, The Morning After: Explaining the Slowdown in
Japanese Growth in the 1990s, 53 J. INT’L ECON. 241 (1999); Naohisa Hirakata, et al.,
Japan’s Financial Crises and Lost Decades, 40 JAPAN WORLD ECON. 31 (2016); Fumio
Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade, 5 REV. ECON.
DYNAMICS 206 (2002); HIROSHI NAKASO, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN JAPAN DURING THE
1990S: HOW THE BANK OF JAPAN RESPONDED AND THE LESSONS LEARNT, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS PAPER NO. 6 (Oct. 2001), https://www.bis.org/
publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf [https://perma.cc/39W2-E6HU]; Naoki Abe, Japan’s
Shrinking Economy, BROOKINGS (Feb. 12, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/japans-shrinking-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Z5PU-UX89].
50 See Unemployment, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 47.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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was a transitory mirage that did not account for the 2008 economic
recession, which sent unemployment rates back above 5%. 54
Nevertheless, this peak was short-lived, and unemployment rates
since have kept plummeting, reaching slightly above 2% in recent
years. 55 Throughout these fluctuations in unemployment at a
national level, murder rates have continued to descend. In this
regard, Japan differs from the United States in that unemployment
rates are more stable (even in periods of recession) and are not
mirrored by murder rates.
Poverty rates in Japan are below those in the United States, but
not considerably so.56 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) categorized the United States as
having a poverty rating of 0.178, while Japan’s was 0.157.57 Poverty
rates in Japan, contrary to murder rates, have followed a steady
increase in recent history. While in the mid-1980s relative poverty
rates were stable at around 12%. In the 1990s, the lost decade would
usher in an increase to 15%. 58 Continued economic stasis, in
addition to a gradual resurgence from the 2008 economic crisis,
drove Japan to a poverty rate of 16.1% in 2012.59 Though the Nippon
54
55

Id.
Id.
See MINISTRY

56
OF HEALTH, LABOR AND WELFARE, 各種世帯の所得等の状況
[INCOME DISTRIBUTION], https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/ktyosa16/dl/03.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PW3-4KDV].
57
Poverty Rate, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://data.
oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm [https://perma.cc/XGH9-HHJ8] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2019).
58
In 2011, demands for social welfare services (Seikatsu-hogo) reached a peak
of two million people. For more information on welfare distribution rates, see
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL (Townsend Centre for International Poverty Research) &
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POPULATION & SOCIAL SECURITY RESEARCH (Kokuritsu Shakai
Hoshō Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo, IPSS), Research Seminar: The State of the Art of
Measuring Poverty and Social Exclusion in the UK and Japan, https://www.bristol.
ac.uk/poverty/ESRCJSPS/uk/1/iwata.html
[https://perma.cc/3L5G-XMTD]
[hereinafter Poverty Research Seminar]. Poverty rates seem to concentrate in the
elderly, the single, and in particular, the single mothers. See Japan’s Worsening
Poverty Rate, NIPPON.COM (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.nippon.com/en/
features/h00072/japan%E2%80%99s-worsening-poverty-rate.html#note-1-1
[https://perma.cc/6CY4-BDSP] (discussing the increase in relative poverty in
Japan while absolute poverty is decreasing); Masami Iwata, UK-Japan
Measurement of Poverty Seminar: Poverty and Social Exclusion in Japan: An
Overview from the 1990s and Recent Policy Responses (Jan. 6, 2012) (unpublished
paper) (analyzing the role of social assistance in measuring poverty).
59
See Japan’s Worsening Poverty Rate, supra note 58.
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nation has partially recuperated since then, achieving a 15.6% rate
of poverty in 2015, 60 the disparity with the United States in this
particular measurement remains relatively limited. In fact, in 2017,
the difference between the countries was only 1% (with relative
poverty rates of 16.3 in Japan, and 17.3% in the United States). 61
Nonetheless, and despite the limited divergence between the
nations, what can be asserted is that Japan’s murder rate has not
historically increased with increasing poverty rates. Murder rates
keep declining, disconnected from the rise in poverty, unlike in the
United States where murder rates and poverty indicators show
associative signs.
At first glance, the United States has more murders per capita
than Japan by a significant margin. Historically, U.S. rates have
oscillated between 4 and 7 murders per 100,000 individuals, with an
average rate between 1960 and 2018 of 6.95. The American history
of murder is characterized by significant fluctuations and
directional variance. Japanese murder rates, which existed at rates
of approximately 3.5 murders per 100,000 individuals in the late
1940s and early 1950s, have been on a continuous and inexorable
decline since. Whereas contemporary U.S. murder rate trends
oscillate between 5 and 6 murders per 100,000 individuals, with an
average rate for the last two decades (2000s and 2010s) of 5.19;
murder rates in Japan have stabilized below 0.3 in recent decades.
But beyond this axiomatic conclusion, there is a more nuanced
inference underlying this trend, and it is tied to rate volatility and
socioeconomic responsiveness. The United States’ murder rates
seem responsive to socioeconomic tendencies and trajectories:
murder rates mirror the ups and downs of different economic
indexes. In particular, there is an observable relationship between
murder rates and unemployment as well as accompanying poverty
Japan’s Poverty Rate Remains Well Above OECD Average, NIPPON.COM (June
27, 2017), https://www.nippon.com/en/behind/l10354/japan%27s-poverty-rateremains-well-above-oecd-average-news.html [https://perma.cc/HGC4-L6X8].
61 Justin McCurry, Japan’s Rising Child Poverty Exposes True Cost of Two Decades
of Economic Decline, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/jan/17/japans-rising-child-poverty-exposes-truth-behind-twodecades-of-economic-decline [https://perma.cc/GEG7-ALZY]; Japan’s Working
Poor Struggling: Poverty Worsens as More Japanese Work on Non-permanent Contracts,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/04/04/
struggling [https://perma.cc/UQX5-XD3K] (outlining Japan’s relative poverty
rates and their sociodemographic effects).
60
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rates, though murder does not seem to correlate with inequality,
which maintains a steady ascension throughout contemporary
American economic history. In Japan, murders keep declining in
number, despite fluctuations in socioeconomic indicators. Murder
rates are in a constant and continuous downward trajectory,
remaining unresponsive to external influxes and variations in the
economy. It is worth mentioning that, during Japan’s lost decade—
a period characterized by economic stasis—murder rates did not
increase. While murder rates in the United States appear volatile
and susceptible to their socioeconomic context, recent Japanese
history shows a continuously declining progression, autonomous
and independent from the selected indicators of inequality,
unemployment, and poverty. After World War II, Japan had an
inflection point in its murder rate, and has experienced a continuous
downward trend ever since, while U.S. murder rates adjust to the
waves of socioeconomic inference.
3.

CITY COMPARISONS: GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MURDER, SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS, AND THE POLICE

3.1. The High-Crime Micro-Unit Thesis and its Shortcomings
Assessing risk of murder by street intersection
The importance of geography in relation to murder has been
studied and examined by legal, criminal, and social academics in
multiple ways. The two principal manners in which geography’s
significance has been utilized as an instrument to inform policy
recommendations regarding murder reduction are: (i) utilizing
geography as an explanatory element for crime, building upon the
assumption that geo-environmental and systemic social networks
affect criminal choices, 62 and (ii) as a predictive tool, deploying
62
These explanatory theories tend to connect underprivileged communities
with higher rates of crime. See generally BETSY GOTBAUM, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. PUB.
ADVOCATE, OLD PROBLEM, NEW EYES: YOUTH INSIGHTS ON GANGS IN NEW YORK CITY
(2008); STEVEN F. MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
(5th ed. 2013) (describing the sociocultural origins of crime); EAMONN CARRABINE,
CRIME AND SOCIAL THEORY (2017) (applying sociological theory to the study of
criminology); KEVIN M. BEAVER, THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF ANTISOCIAL
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location of crime as an element that can serve to anticipate and
predict future crime.
Explanatory models understand geographic communities as
sociocultural sources of crime, and by providing analytical
foundations as to the nature of the root of crime, attempt to
understand, and comprehensively address its causes and structural
components. Predictive models separate themselves from the
qualitative essence that permeates explanatory theses, somewhat
discarding the interpretive premises that underlie criminal activity.
Instead, they choose to comprehend the geo-spatial order and
method to crime. By identifying the systemic patterns embedded
within the location of past crimes, these models attempt to discern
potential future locations of criminal activity. Most models draw
from elements on both sides of this dichotomy, as these theoretical
pillars are not exclusive nor entirely independent. Both analytic
propositions acknowledge that geography is a crucial component in
determining crime in general and murder in particular, though they
approach crime prevention and resolution differently.
Predictive models, like the one evaluated and applied in this
Paper, are not novel in concept, and they generally build on decades
of data observation. In the 1950s and 1960s, legal researchers and
OUTCOMES (2008) (exploring biosocial explanations for criminal behavior); DONALD
R. CRESSEY AND DAVID A. WARD, DELINQUENCY, CRIME, AND SOCIAL PROCESS (1969)
(applying sociological theory to the study of criminology); DON C. GIBBONS, SOCIETY,
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1987) (outlining perspectives on the relationship
between social structure and criminal behavior); HUGH D. BARLOW & SCOTT H.
DECKER, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY: PUTTING THEORY TO WORK (2010)
(describing the capabilities of public policy to impact criminal behavior); CARLO
MORSELLI, CRIME AND NETWORKS (2014) (relating crime networks to crime
geography and co-offending patterns); TIM NEWBURN & RICHARD SPARKS, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CULTURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
CRIME CONTROL (2004) (exploring national and international elements of policy as a
controlling superstructure of criminal activity); DON CREWE, BECOMING CRIMINAL:
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL ORIGINS OF LAW, TRANSGRESSION, AND DEVIANCE (2013)
(analyzing the socio-cultural origins of crime). See also David Canter & Donna
Youngs, Crime and Society, 11 CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 283, 283-88 (2016); Robert J. Bursik,
Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and Prospects,
26 CRIMINOLOGY 519, 519-51 (1988); Charis Kubrin & Ronald Weitzer. New Directions
in Social Disorganization Theory, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 374, 374-402 (2003)
(linking criminal activity to what can be addressed as “social disorganization,”
establishing crime as a consequence to neighborhood dynamics with high mobility,
non-cohesive and disaggregating criminal dynamics, and crime-prone social
dysfunctionality).
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criminologists were already identifying and recognizing similar
geographical tendencies. Observing, for example, that in Houston
70% of murders took place in 18% of the census tracts in the city,63
and that in Cleveland data showed that two thirds of the crimes took
place in 12% of the geographical space of the city. 64 Modern
technology and advanced data-gathering techniques have paved
this old path, and given way to highly sophisticated methods of
crime mapping.65 By sequencing and geo-referencing crime records,
these models of crime codification generate operational riskintensity values 66 that aid in the visualization of patterns of
criminality risk by geographical area. 67 One of the foundational
assumptions to the success of these models is that they perceive past
crime as a extrapolative communication of future crime, and task the
past to optimally predict forthcoming criminal activity.68
The theory that this Paper addresses falls within the predictive
category, and intends to advance its principles to new levels of geopositional certainty through advancing the predictive data inferred
from (i) geolocation of crime, and (ii) those who perpetrate it. Braga,
Papachristos, and Hureau’s high-crime micro-unit thesis (or hot
spot theory) 69 attempts to, through location-data gathering and
regressive inferences, detect and identify crime patterns, and,
determining where murders (and shootings) occurred in the past,
conclude where they are most likely to happen in the future.70 Their
findings, however, take the theory one step further to conclude that
“city-level gun violence trends may best be understood by the
analyses of trends at a very small number of micro places, such as
street segments and intersections, rather than analyses of trends at
larger areal units such as neighborhoods, arbitrarily-defined
policing districts, or census tracts.”71
Henry A. Bullock, Urban Homicide in Theory and Fact, 45 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 565, 565‒75 (1955); ROBERT C. BENSING & OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.,
HOMICIDE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY 567‒69 (1960).
64 BENSING & SCHROEDER, supra note 63.
65
SHANE D. JOHNSON, KATE J. BOWERS & KEN PEASE, CRIME SCIENCE: NEW
APPROACHES TO PREVENTING AND DETECTING CRIME 145 (2005).
66 Id. at 147.
67 Id. at 152.
68 Id. at 146.
69 See generally Braga et al., supra note 2; see also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 65,
at 148.
70 See generally Braga et al., supra note 2.
71 Id. at 48.
63
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Furthermore, Braga et al. reject the idea that defining the “atrisk” population as “young, minority males living in disadvantaged
Their thesis deems this
neighborhoods” is sufficient. 72
categorization of murder-perpetrators as insufficiently refined and
suggests it does not capture the actual levels of concentration of citybased gun violence. 73 In fact, they propose that murder cases,
consequent to gun violence, are much more concentrated than
previous proposals may submit. 74 Their findings can be better
explained in a two-part conclusion, which will be comparatively
analyzed throughout the next section. Generally, the hot spots
theory addresses and predicts (i) the individuals that commit
murder, and (ii) the locations in which murder occurs. Pertaining to
the first analytical element, that of perpetrators, in 2006 “about 1%
of Boston’s youth ages 15-24 participated in gangs and these gangs
accounted for 50% of total homicides, 77% of youth homicides, and
70% of fatal and non-fatal shootings in Boston.”75 Regarding the
second analytical element, that of geographical allocation of
criminal incidents, 89% of street segments in Boston never withstood
any reported firearm related incident, around 6% had a single
firearm incident, and the remaining shootings occurred in 5% of the
street segments.76 The analytical conclusion that can be drawn from
their theory is that murder is “largely concentrated at a small
number of gun violence hot spots.”77 In order to remedy hot spot
violence, Braga et al. propose a model in which prevention efforts
(both in terms of police action and social work) are dedicated and
focused in very specific locations and towards very specific people
rather than diffused across neighborhoods.78
This Paper observes these categorized qualities (perpetrators’
network79 and geographical location) as potentially predictive but
Id. at 48-51.
Id.
74
Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 48-49.
77 Id. at 50.
78 Id.
79
Though the Paper does not address this issue directly or exhaustively, it is
worth noting that it identifies that a comprehensively reductionist approach to the
human component of Braga et al.’s proposition appears to determine commission
of past crime as a sign of high likelihood of potential commission of future crime.
72
73
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finds the hot spot theory insufficiently explanatory. The Paper
attempts to uncover more granular qualities that may contribute to
an explanation for the existence of hot spots, as well as expand its
potential multi-city and cross-cultural contributions to the reduction
of murder rates. The comparative analysis that will be conducted
intends to assess the socio-legal value of the thesis at transnational,
and therefore intercultural levels. In this regard, through the
contrastive scrutiny of different cities, this Paper aims to assess the
value of the hot spot model as either potentially applicable through
a wide range of cities, or as merely descriptive of Boston’s gun
violence problem. To this end, this Paper sets out to accomplish two
main objectives. The first objective of the Paper is to establish
whether the model is internationally and interculturally useful and
applicable. The second objective of this Paper is to serve as a basis
to achieve a better understanding of the model, adding potential
avenues of implementation and development to it.
This
development intends to both substantiate more robust exegetic
foundations for the concentration of geographically-allocated
criminal activity in general, and murders in particular; and add to
the serviceability of culturally expansive implementable policy
recommendations. In other words, building on the knowledge and
inferences provided by predictive modeling as well as on the
comparative transnational and intercultural conclusions, this Paper
intends to produce effective policy recommendations that may serve
to reduce crime in the form of murder in the United States. The cities
to be comparatively analyzed for these purposes are Boston and
Osaka, as well as New York and Tokyo.
The foundational reasoning and policy proposals addressed and
projected by this Paper attempt to avoid entirely culturalist
approaches to sociolegal issues of conduct. Put differently, the
Paper purposefully avoids exclusively cultural arguments and
explanations ascribed solely to particular cultures or subcultures of
violence, instead pursuing to endorse concrete, tangible, and
specific recommendations. Though not intending to establish that

This could create a necessarily prejudicial and discriminatory conceptualization
towards offenders, informing equally prejudicial and discriminatory policies, both
(i) in an unfair, unjust, and pre-injurious manner, and (ii) becoming a source for
decision-making bias, marking these individuals for a higher likelihood of
secondary deviation, among other harmful social consequences.
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culture has no explanatory value, 80 purely historic and cultural
critiques are difficult to translate into constructive policy goals with
direct and observable results. Furthermore, at its inception, this
Paper recognizes that the elements addressed in this analysis
(economic factors and policing) are not the exclusive elements that
may contribute to murder as a social issue but that they are relatively
unexplored together, and have the potential to provide explanatory
insights for murder rate variance, as well as to become resources for
policy formulations deployed towards the reduction of said rates.
Boston is necessarily selected for this analysis because it is the
city in which Bragas et al.’s foundational investigation was
conducted. Osaka was chosen as a contrast city to Boston, due to its
geographical and identity proximity to the economic center of the
country (in Japan Tokyo, and in the United States New York), in
addition to their resemblance as post-industrial second-tier
metropolises. New York and Tokyo were chosen as comparative
control cities, with the aspiration that, not only would they serve as
governing elements to the corroborative efforts of the Paper, but that
their contrast might enhance and increase the effectiveness of the
analysis. The added value of this international, multi-city, and
pluri-jurisdictional contrastive and evaluative exercise is central to
the Paper. Observing the dramatically lower murder rates in Japan
through a comparative sociolegal and policy lens, the Paper intends
to identify key differences between the United States and Japan—
within the categories of socioeconomic context and policing—to
propose policy recommendations directed at reducing murder rates
in the United States in emulating some of Japan’s successful
approaches to the issue.

80
The literature tends to allude to Japan’s post-war resurgence and its cultural
symbiosis with rejection of violence, or other purely cultural elements like the
stigmatization of arrest, elevated social cohesion, and individual moral prevention
patterns consequent to an acute social awareness of the limitations of one’s freedom
as some of the possible explanations for the continuous decline in murders. This
Paper will attempt to move beyond these types of esoteric statements to produce
corporeal and implementable policy recommendations based on Japan’s
discernable sociolegal design and structural policy success at reducing murder
rates. GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE, supra note 39; W. K. PARK, TRENDS IN CRIME
RATES IN POSTWAR JAPAN: A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2006); Nobuo Komiya, A
Cultural Study Of The Low Crime Rate In Japan, 39 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 369, 369-90
(1999).
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3.2. Boston and Osaka
Murder, the Economy, and the Police: Inequality and Concentration,
Against Integration and Dispersion
The objective of this section is to uncover potential patterns
underlying the grouping, organization, and materialization of
murder that may be encountered in Boston and Osaka; and either
confirm or refute the applicable efficacy of the hot spot theory in
multi-city and cross-cultural conditions. Then, conclusions will be
drawn as to the similarities or differences between both cities to
build upon Bragas et al.’s model for the purposes of policy
recommendations. The structure of the analysis will first follow a
contextualization of the cities within their respective nations and
regions, proceeding with an examination of socioeconomic factors
and their relationship to historic and geographic murder patterns,
continuing with a comparative analysis of police force geographical
presence, concluding with a valuation of the hot spots theory and its
validity.
First, both cities should be contextualized in terms of where they
stand as to murder rates within their nations, to better understand
how representative they are as a sample, as well as reference the
position they occupy within their respective regional conditions.
Though the cities may be similar in general terms as to their country
geopolitical significance as urban nuclei and regarding sociocultural
positioning, as well as in murder rates relative to their country
average, they occupy vastly different spaces in what pertains to their
directly comparable intentional homicide averages. In the United
States in 2016, the total national murder rate was 5.4 per 100,000
individuals.81 Massachusetts ranked as the 9th state with the lowest
murder rates, with 1.9 per 100,000 individuals—well below the
Northeast region 82 average of 3.5 murders. 83 In 2016, Boston
accumulated 36.57% of all Massachusetts murders cases, for a rate

Crime in the United States, FBI, supra note 15.
See Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 20152016, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.2016/tables/table-2 [https://perma.cc/6XMB-XERJ].
83
Id.
81
82
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of 7.27 intentional homicides per 100,000 individuals. 84 This 7.27
murder rate positions Boston significantly above the United States
average of 5.4 and critically above the Massachusetts average of 1.9.
In essence, Massachusetts is a comparatively peaceful state 85 in
relation to the rest of the United States, but Boston’s murder rate is
above the national average, and significantly above the regional and
state averages.
In 2016, the Osaka Prefecture police reported a total of 110
murders.86 This set the prefecture’s murder rate at an estimated 0.55
per 100,000 individuals—which, though significantly lower than
Boston’s 7.27, was still above Japan’s 0.28 national average,
encompassing 30.39% of the nation’s total murders that year. 87
Despite Osaka having murder rates that surpass the national norm,
and being historically regarded as one of the cities with the highest
murder rates in the country,88 the Nippon city ranks number three
84
In Massachusetts there were 134 murders, for a total population of
6,811,779. In Boston, there were 49 murders, for a total population of 673,880.
Massachusetts: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-6/table-6-statecuts/massachusetts.xls [https://perma.cc/9E77-A537].
85
Further contextualizing the present state of gun violence in Boston and
N.Y.C., Massachusetts and New York state were tied in 2017 for second place as the
States with the least gun deaths in the United States (48th and 49th respectively). In
both Massachusetts and New York gun-related fatalities stood at 3.7 per 100,000
residents, and the only state with less firearm deaths was Hawaii with 2.5. This
situates Massachusetts and New York well below the national average for gunrelated fatalities per state, which stood at 13.6 per 100,000 residents. The list was
led by the state of Alaska with a rate of 24.5 firearm-related deaths per 100,000
individuals. Gun-related fatality rates did not descend to the single-digit
measurements until the 41st state in the descending ranking (Iowa, 9.0)—making
Massachusetts and New York statistical anomalies. The gun-related issues of these
states are grave in comparison to those of Japan, but within the U.S. national
average, they fall within a moderate spectrum—evidencing the severity of the
United States’ gun problem when compared to Japanese firearm social dynamics.
Firearm Mortality by State, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION.,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/firearm_mortality/firearm.htm
[perma.cc/N2KG-ZV2Y] (last updated Apr. 29, 2020).
86
See 重 要 犯 罪 (Crime Statistics), OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE,
https://www.police.pref.osaka.lg.jp/material/files/group/2/h30_02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YS7F-D6JD].
87 Intentional Homicides, supra note 7; Japan, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra
note 1.
88 犯罪統計資料: 平成 18 年 1~12 月分[Crime Statistics: January – December 2006],
NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/keiji21/20070409.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PN2-UAVZ].
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on The Economist’s list of the Safe Cities Index, which speaks
favorably to the safety of Japan overall.89 Osaka may have higher
murder rates than the rest of Japan, but it is still considered a
remarkably safe city from an international perspective.
The main theoretical outcomes of the high-crime micro-unit
thesis are intrinsically related to murder location—an analysis of
both the micro-geographical setting of the murders, as well as how
they interact with the socioeconomic factors and policing structure
surrounding them follows. In Boston, as mentioned above, only 1%
of local youth from the ages of 15 to 24 participated in gangs, and
these gangs accounted for 50% of the murders and 70% of all fatal
shootings.90 Regarding location, 89% of street segments in Boston
never withstood any reported firearm related incident, around 6%
had a single firearm incident, and the remaining 5% of the street
segments absorbed the overwhelming majority of gun violence and
consequent murder.91
What is particularly relevant for understanding the hot spot that
so disproportionately represents Boston’s crime rates within a
socioeconomic and policing context is that murders occur in the
areas of the city most affected by inequality. These are also the areas
of the city with the highest unemployment rates, the highest indexed
poverty, the least police community-presence, and the least
geographically integrated dispersion of police forces.
Boston’s inequality ratios are amongst the highest of any city in
America.92 In 2014, Boston topped the Brookings Institute inequality
89
THE ECONOMIST, SAFE CITIES INDEX 2017: SECURITY IN A RAPIDLY URBANISING
WORLD (2017), https://dkf1ato8y5dsg.cloudfront.net/uploads/5/82/safe-citiesindex-eng-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQX5-YP66].
90 Id.
91 Braga et al., supra note 2, at 48-49.
92 Kyle Scott Clauss, Boston’s Income Inequality, Visualized, BOSTON MAG. (Feb.
23,
2017,
11:11
AM),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2017/
02/23/boston-income-inequality-map/ [https://perma.cc/U9LT-4P52]; Benjamin
Swasey, Report: Boston Ranks No. 1 For City Income Inequality, WBUR NEWS (Jan. 14,
2016),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2016/01/14/boston-income-inequalitybrookings-2016-update [https://perma.cc/HD5C-H6CZ]; Natalie Holmes & Alan
Berube, City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by Declining Incomes,
BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/city-andmetropolitan-inequality-on-the-rise-driven-by-declining-incomes/
[https://perma.cc/H3KY-ZWSE]. Boston (like Osaka) suffers higher poverty and
unemployment rates than the national average. The fact that these two indicators
are elevated above the national average, and accompanied by higher murder rates,
seems to corroborate that, at least in this case, and attaining exclusively to these
isolated factors, higher wealth inequality and poverty may produce higher murder
rates.
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charts with a ratio of 17.8 (when the average ratio across the United
States was 9.3 for metropolitan areas and 11.8 for large cities).93 The
gap between the wealthy and the poor remains one of the widest
throughout the United States, but in 2016 Boston dropped to sixth
place in the large city ranking, accumulating a still significant
inequality index of 14.7. 94 Though comparatively reducing its
inequality indexes at a national level, this reduction is slight, and
Boston remains a highly inequitable city.
In 2016, the city of Boston had an unemployment rate that
oscillated between 3 and 4%. 95 This is a lower figure than in
previous recent years, and evidences a constant trajectory of labor
rate improvement for the city. In 2014, just two years prior, the rate
stood at 6%, and in 2010, it was at 8%.96 Unemployment is currently
similar to the national average, which has stabilized around 4%.97 In
what pertains to poverty, Boston’s relative rates are above 20%—
and have been for the last decade, with few oscillations.98 This is
significantly higher than the national average, which currently
stands at around 12%. 99 However, what is most significant
See City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by Declining Incomes
BROOKINGS INST., supra note 92.
94
Alan Berube, City and Metropolitan Income Inequality Data Reveal Ups and
Downs Through 2016, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/city-and-metropolitan-income-inequality-data-reveal-ups-and-downsthrough-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3K65-7CNQ].
95
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.
bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT257165000000003?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&out
put_view=data&include_graphs=true [https://perma.cc/6MNZ-5367].
95
Database, Tables, & Calculators by Subject: Local Area Unemployment Statistics,
U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT2571650000
00003?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_graphs=true
[https://perma.cc/6MNZ-5367] (last visited June 16, 2020).
96 In 2014, the unemployment rate was 5.2%, 2015 4.3%, 2016 3.5%, 2017 3.4%,
and 2018 3.0%. Id. (indicating a linearly constant betterment of unemployment).
97 See discussion supra Section 2.
98
QuickFacts: Boston City, Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bostoncitymassachusetts/IPE12
0217#IPE120217 [https://perma.cc/QG59-FEEN] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019);
DATAUSA:
BOSTON,
MA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/boston-ma/
[https://perma.cc/ZLT3-LYEX] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Poverty in Boston,
REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY/RES.
DIVISION
(Mar.
2014),
BOSTON
http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/f1ecaf8a-d529-40b6-a9bc8b4419587b86 [https://perma.cc/EP3S-WVTU].
99
Fontenot et al., supra note 31.
93
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pertaining to micro-locational wealth disparity concentration is that
the neighborhoods with the highest murder intensity are also those
most disproportionately affected by the inequality that afflicts the
city. 100 Most murders occur in the neighborhoods of Mattapan
(15.1% unemployment), Dorchester (12.6%), and Roxbury (14.3%)—
where most of the households earn under $20,000 in yearly
income.101 The poorest neighborhoods are concentrated in the south
of Boston—this is also the area in which most of the murders occur,
and the area in which there is less geographically-integrated
community police presence. There is only one police station located
roughly at the geographical center between the three
neighborhoods, though dislodged from the spaces in which murder
cases cluster.102
In Osaka, unlike in Boston, crime generally and murder in
particular seems to spread itself much more evenly throughout
districts—in both the prefecture and the city.103 In the same way,
police presence disperses accordingly, and law enforcement is much

100 Neighborhood Unemployment: A Technical Note, BOSTON PLAN. & DEV. AGENCY
RES. DIVISION (2017), http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/95a9e699-fd4e4224-a8a8-df01a563e8b6 [https://perma.cc/HHA9-56VW]; Unemployment in
Boston,
BOSTON
REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY/RES.
DIVISION
(2014),
http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/390b9ea9-61d7-467b-9a4cf6e8588aa4b0 [https://perma.cc/2VSE-8NT2]; see also Analysis of Present State of
Osaka City per District (Unemployment Rate in 2010), OSAKA CITY GOV’T,
https://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/toshikeikaku/page/0000249886.html
[https://perma.cc/H3VK-N7ZH].
101 See Neighborhood Unemployment: A Technical Note, BOSTON PLAN. & DEV.
AGENCY RES. DIVISION; Unemployment in Boston, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY/RES. DIVISION, supra note 100. This is particularly true in the city’s B3,
B2, and northwest C11 sectors. Braga et al., supra note 2, at 49. See also Boston Police
Stations, Boston Open Data, http://bostonopendata-boston.opendata.arcgis.com/
datasets/e5a0066d38ac4e2abbc7918197a4f6af_6/data [https://perma.cc/K5PWTGKU].
102
See Neighborhood Unemployment: A Technical Note, BOSTON PLAN. & DEV.
AGENCY RES. DIVISION; Unemployment in Boston, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY/RES. DIVISION, supra note 100; Braga et al., supra note 2, at 49.
103
Overarching meta-data reveals the expansive and dispersed nature of
murder across Japanese cities, as opposed to the high concentration of murders in
the analyzed U.S. cities. See Changes of Numbers of Serious Crimes per Year, OSAKA
PREFECTURAL POLICE,
https://www.police.pref.osaka.lg.jp/seikatsu/hanzai/
4228.html; [https://perma.cc/GR2S-N22D]; Ryuji Kutsuzawa et al., The Impact of
Crime on Housing Land Prices and the Effects of Police Boxes and Voluntary Groups on
Crime Prevention in Japan 32 (Kwansei Gakuin University, Discussion Paper No. 60,
2010).
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more pervasive throughout the city landscape.104 Osaka city police
categorizes murder within the nomenclature of “brutal crime,” a
classification under which the authorities report all brutal crimes
jointly. This definitional umbrella includes crimes like murder,
robbery with assault, rape, and arson.105 The total reported brutal
crimes within the city limits in 2016 was 342.106 This makes the rate
of brutal crimes 2.137 per 100,000 individuals. 107 Through data
estimates,108 the total number of murders within the city of Osaka is
projected to be approximately 30, which would convey a rate of 1.1
murders per 100,000 individuals—significantly above the
prefecture’s average of 0.55; in the same way that Boston's 7.27
murders place above the Massachusetts state average of 1.9.109 The
state of murder in Osaka city also situates the metropolis well above
the national average of 0.28 murders per 100,000 individuals.
A socioeconomic and criminal analysis of Osaka’s
neighborhoods reveals that criminal activity in general, and murder
in particular, are (i) low in comparison to Boston, and (ii) spread
almost equally throughout the city, without attending considerably
to factors of geographical accumulation of wealth.110 In fact, the area
104 Koban Index, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.pref.osaka.
jp/04shikumi/koban/index.html [https://perma.cc/73FM-5PRP] (last visited
Apr. 24, 2019) (showing the iterations of police boxes every several city blocks). See
generally sources cited infra notes 250, 251.
105
See Numbers of Acknowledgment of Crime, per Crimes, per
Cities/Wards/Towns/Villages, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.pref.
osaka.lg.jp/material/files/group/2/h30_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QPB-FVKK]
[hereinafter Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka].
106 Id.
107
Calculations are made in accordance with a total population of 2,714,497
residents. Profile of Osaka City, OSAKA CITY, https://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/
contents/wdu020/enjoy/en/overview/content_CityProfile.html
[https://perma.cc/HJ89-M8U4] (last updated Oct. 1, 2019).
108
The Osaka Prefecture police provide a breakdown of brutal crimes in
which rapes and murders are included within the same category. The rape
numbers for Japan in 2016 were 989, while there were 895 murders (including
attempts)—and in the Osaka Prefecture there were 110 murders and 100 rapes.
Observing the approximate 10% difference between rapes and murders both in
Japan as well as in Osaka, the estimate assumed to pursue this calculation is that of
a conservative 0.40 murders per 0.60 rapes. See Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra
note 105.
109 Id.
110
The accumulation of criminal activity in the areas most affected by
inequality is not as significant, nor as exclusively centrifugal, as it is in Boston.
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with the most crimes is a commercial ward, and the offenses
perpetrated tend to be property crimes.111 These crimes occur in the
Chūō-ku district, in which the income is higher than average for the
city.112 When shifting the focus to other neighborhoods, the analysis
reveals a confirmation of this pattern. The district with the most
brutal crimes resulting in murder is Kita, which reports higher than
average income for the city, and also reports some of the lowest
levels of unemployment—sustaining an estimated 4.8 murders per
100,000 residents.113 Next, with 1.6 estimated murders per 100,000
residents, are the districts of Tenoji, (the richest district in the city,
and again, in the lowest bracket of unemployment), 114 and Ikuno
and Naniwa (both with average household income, and average and
lower than average unemployment rates respectively). 115 The
murder rates then diminish to estimates of 1.2 per 100,000 for the
commercial district of Chūō-ku.116 In fact, Nishinari, which is the
district with the lowest income within the city limits, as well as the
most unemployment of all of Osaka city, holds this same reported
record of an estimated 1.2 murders per 100,000 residents. 117 It is
worth mentioning that Nishinari is the district with the second
highest count of brutal crimes with 47 (after the commercial district
of Chūō-ku with 56), but most of them involve robbery.118 The rest
Crime conglomeration in Osaka is constrained to property crime, and in fact,
murder does not follow this trend of partial symmetry at all. See Statistic Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications of Japan, National Census (2010)
[hereinafter Japanese Census]; OSAKA PREFECTURE, Changes of the Rate of Public
Assistance (reference material in the third meeting of the Council of Establishment
of Special Wards in Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City) (Apr. 26, 2013) [hereinafter
Public Assistance Rates]; Hatena Blog, GEO_SEABOOK (May 5, 2018), https://cdnak.f.st-hatena.com/images/fotolife/g/geo_seabook/20180505/20180505
205838.png [https://perma.cc/ZQ5S-M5DN]
[hereinafter
Hatena Blog];
Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
111
See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note
110; Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
112 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110;
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
113 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110;
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
114 See Hatena Blog, supra note 110.
115 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110;
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
116 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110;
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
117
See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note
110; Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
118 See Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105.
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of the city, including average and above average income districts,
vary between no murders and 0.4 murders per 100,000 residents in
general.119
The above paragraph does not intend to assert absolutely that
Osaka is a metropolis without contrasts in what pertains to
socioeconomic divergences. Both the city of Osaka and the
prefecture surpass the national average of residents receiving
welfare, albeit while being one of the nation’s most prominent
capital-generating engines—and though the dispersion of said
welfare benefits tends to be generally diffused throughout the
districts, there are several pockets of poverty concentration like the
Nishinari or Naniwa districts. 120 The average rate of welfare
recipients in Japan tends to be between 10 and 20 individuals per
1,000 during periods of economic stability. 121 However, at a
prefectural level, within the last decade, Osaka has increased its
welfare recipients to rates that are above 30 individuals per 1,000. In
2011, the average number of recipients in Japan was 16.4 per 1,000
compared to 33.9 in Osaka’s Prefecture.122 In recent history, the city
itself has also increased its necessity for governmental assistance
steadily. In the last two decades Osaka city has incremented its
welfare recipients from those similar to national averages,
oscillating between 10 to 16 individuals per every 1,000, to having
above 50 residents per 1,000 in need of benefit programs.123 Many
of the above-mentioned districts like Naniwa and Ikuno receive
assistance that is significantly above average (103.8 and 73.1 per
1,000, respectively). 124 A special mention, again, is required for
Id.
See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; see also Regional Information:
Osaka, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/
region/osaka/ [https://perma.cc/MU2X-JKNU] (last visited June 16, 2020).
121 See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra
note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110. Welfare recipiency in Japan stood
at approximately 25 per 1,000 individuals in the post-war era, moving into
standards oscillating between 15 and 5 since then, and until an abrupt variance
immediately following the 2008 crisis, where welfare recipient rates would ascend
to 25 per 1,000 once again.
122
See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra
note 110.
123
See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra
note 110.
124
See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra
note 110.
119
120
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Nishinari, which has received welfare assistance at rates of 234.7 per
1,000 district residents.125 The most relevant derived data for the
purposes of this analysis is that, despite the signals of poverty (or
more accurately, of public intervention to prevent poverty), these
figures don’t seem to translate into higher murder rates in the
disproportionately affected districts—as they do in Boston. The data
also reinforces the assumption that in Osaka, individuals with
different levels of wealth live in comparatively integrated locations,
with districts housing economically diverse population, unlike in
Boston. In fact, Tennoji, the city’s wealthiest district as it pertains to
income per capita, still had a number of residents above the national
average that qualified to receive government assistance (at 23.6 per
1,000) in 2012.126 Overall, the unemployment rate in Osaka, like that
of Boston, has been decreasing throughout the last decade. In 2019,
the professional inactivity indicators stabilized at 3.2%—a
recovering standard from previous years, as in 2016 the city suffered
4% unemployment rates, and in 2013 the city sustained a 4.8%
rate.127
Singularly pertinent to this examination of the location of
murder in Osaka, and a key structural difference with Boston, is the
geographical disposition and arrangement of the police forces.
Police stations (hereinafter referred to as “koban”) in Osaka are
allocated throughout the city. In Boston there are 12 police stations,
outlying the communities they serve; whereas in Osaka there are 649
koban, and they are spread all throughout the neighborhoods in an
almost ubiquitous manner, iterating every several city blocks. 128
Nishinari alone, the poorest district of Osaka, has twelve of these
koban.129 Tenoji, the richest, has seven.130 For comparison, Ikuno

125
See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra
note 110.
126
See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110.
127
Employment Statistics Report (Yearly Average), OSAKA PREFECTURAL GOV’T,
http://www.pref.osaka.lg.jp/toukei/roucho_n/index.html
[perma.cc/Q2AWCRMU] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
128
Koban Index, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, supra note 104.
129
Koban index: Nishinari, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.
pref.osaka.lg.jp/sogo/keisatsusyo/1/6323.html [https://perma.cc/C8V4-AEV6]
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
130
Koban index: Tenoji, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.
pref.osaka.lg.jp/sogo/keisatsusyo/1/6332.html [https://perma.cc/44B3-CXK9]
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
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has ten, Chūō-ku has nine, and Naniwa eight.131 Kita, the district
with the most estimated murders, has only four. 132 This
geolocational structuring and spatial distribution of police resources
presents a disjunctive organizational model. In Boston, police
stations are far more geographically isolated and diffused; whereas
in Osaka, koban are spatially pervasive—necessarily inserting
themselves into the geographic heart of neighborhood social and
economic interactions.
This Paper will now examine more closely the potential analytic
value and translatability of the high-crime micro-unit thesis. The
hot spot theory posits that the analysis of gun violence and murder
is better understood through the lens of (i) specific locations in
which crime will gather, and (ii) specific concentric social groups
that perpetrate them.133 The first hypothesis of crime presented by
the hot spot theory (geographic concentration of murder) does not
hold up to a comparative analysis with the city of Osaka. This is due
to the fact that crime in general, and murders in particular, are
spread across the Japanese city with significantly less
conglomeration than in Boston. Criminal accounts of murder
appear to be arrayed subject to factors that are not dictated by, or
subject to, the socioeconomic situation of their residents, unlike in
Boston.
The second foundational claim of the hot spots theory is the
prediction that murders will be highly concentrated in relation to its
enacting agents.134 By observing the highly limited group of people
perpetrating murders in Boston, the hot spot theory projects that
murders are disproportionately committed by a small, concentrated,
and concentric group of people that operates within the same
cohesive network of crime.135 Osaka’s murder patterns defeat this
prong of the theory as well. The reason for the lack of translatability
is that, in Osaka city and prefecture, there is almost no recidivism.
In fact, recidivism is so low in Japan that by 2005, only five cases of
131
Koban index: Ikuno, Chūō-ku, and Naniwa, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE,
https://www.police.pref.osaka.jp [https://perma.cc/PN3N-V4UP] (last visited
Apr. 19, 2019).
132
Koban index: Kita, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.
pref.osaka.lg.jp/sogo/keisatsusyo/1/6346.html [https://perma.cc/44B3-CXK9]
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
133 See Braga et al., supra note 2, at 48.
134
Id.
135
Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

842

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

murder from the last 1,768 presented recidivism.136 This may be due
to the fact that murders are generally spontaneous and occur
principally in the context of trivial disputes—except in highly
unlikely anomalies like murders perpetrated by the Yakuza crime
organizations.137 Specifically, in the Osaka Prefecture in 2017, there
were a total of 106 murders.138 For these 106 murders, there were
103 different individuals arrested. 139 In 2018, there were 114
murders and 114 different individuals arrested; 140 statistics that
exhibit a high disparity with the high concentration of perpetrators
present in Boston.
In conclusion, Boston and Osaka present vastly different
narrative scenarios pertaining to their states of murder—both
regarding location dispersion, as well as the individuals that
perform it. This is because in Boston (i) murders are acutely
concentrated in their geographical allocation, and (ii) the criminal
action of intentional homicide is realized by a small group of
perpetrators—in particular, located within the geographical spaces
most disproportionately affected by inequality, which suffer the
lowest income, display the highest unemployment rates, and
comprise lower geographical distribution of integrated-stationed
police. By contrast, in Osaka (i) murder is spread proportionately
and uniformly throughout the city, (ii) with near non-existent levels
of recidivism—and criminal activity mapping does not attend to the
particular socioeconomic factors of wealth distribution, as crime
See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra note 6, at 334.
Id. The stable decrease of gun violence in Japan is accompanied by, and
consequent to, the strengthening of policies and the reinforcement of legal
constrictions surrounding the nation’s organized crime collectives and networks
(also known as Yakuza or Boryokudan), which disproportionately concentrated
murders and gun violence. See generally DAVID E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA:
JAPAN’S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD (2003); MIYAZAKI MANABU, TOPPAMONO: OUTLAW.
RADICAL. SUSPECT. MY LIFE IN JAPAN’S UNDERWORLD (2005); PETER B. E. HILL, THE
JAPANESE MAFIA: YAKUZA, LAW, AND THE STATE (2006); EIKO MARUKO SINIAWER,
RUFFIANS, YAKUZA, NATIONALISTS: THE VIOLENT POLITICS OF MODERN JAPAN, 18601960 (2008); Bruce A. Gragert, Yakuza: The Warlords of Japanese Organized Crime, 4
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 147 (1997); Jake Adelstein, Crime Report Suggests the
Yakuza are Evolving, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.japan
times.co.jp/news/2015/08/01/national/media-national/crime-report-suggestsyakuza-evolving/#.XnXzH2hKhPY [https://perma.cc/UK4C-N674]. See NAT’L
POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN 31 (2018), https://www.npa.go.jp/english/
Police_of_Japan/Police_of_Japan_2018_full_text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TCH4AV62] (referencing unlawful gun possession).
138 See Changes of Numbers of Serious Crimes per Year, supra note 103.
139 Id.
140 Id.
136
137
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mobility and dispersion are much more ubiquitous and
geographically equitable, and police presence geolocation is
significantly diffused throughout neighborhoods, and integrated
within them. Further, not only is the geographical organization of
crime divergent between these two cities, but the difference between
the resulting murder rates is also critical. In Boston, the murder
rates are significantly higher than in Osaka. However, this does not
necessarily deny the hot spots theory, or imply its comprehensive
failure. One likely explanation inferred from the data may be that
of a categorical inapplicability of the theory at cross-cultural,
international, or multi-city systemic scopes—at least in what refers
to Japan generally, and Osaka in particular. A second explanation
may reveal that Japan is ahead of the curve in murder prevention—
that the hot spots theory may not be applicable because it has
already been resolved through the resolution of structurally
differential elements like (i) geographic socioeconomic integration,
and (ii) equitable areal distribution of police or other conflictresolution and safety resources. This proposition of a post-hot spot
scenario is a potential interpretation of the data if socioeconomic
factors of inequality, and localization of poverty and
unemployment, are believed to play a role in the increase or
decrease of murder rates within a community. Osaka does not
present these trends (geographically demarcated inequality and lack
of police presence in the areas most affected by inequality) with the
intensity that Boston does, and consequently presents lower murder
rates. In other words, the hot spots theory may be applicable,
accounting for the fundamental socioeconomic difference between
Osaka and Boston—which is that of the disproportionate affectation
of particular geographic pockets by economic inequality,
unemployment, and poverty in Boston; an inequity phenomenon
that does not exist at the same scale in Osaka—and which is perhaps
preemptively resolved by effective welfare systems that prevent
inequality
conglomeration,
strengthen
socioeconomic
neighborhood integration, and promote geographical dilation of
social safety resources (including the police). At a resource
allocation level, the territorial ubiquity of police presence is a crucial
structural distinction in murder prevention activity between the two
cities, which in Osaka seems conducive to significantly lower levels
of murder, and a lack of its geographical localization in
socioeconomically depressed hot spots. Pervasive police presence,
or that of other social safety resources, paired with higher
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socioeconomic integration across neighborhoods, may (i) reduce
overall rates of crime and murder, and (ii) prevent the localization
of crime both geographically and in those who commit it.
3.3. New York and Tokyo
This section will engage in a comparative analysis of another two
cities: New York and Tokyo. The evaluation of the state of murder
will follow the framework utilized in the prior section. This
contrastive control segment will examine the dynamics of murder in
both New York and Tokyo, and how they are integrated and
interrelate with their geographically-dependent standing,
sociodemographic environment, and with the conditions and
infrastructural deployment of the cities’ respective police forces.
Once potential patterns regarding the geolocation of murders are
discerned within the larger sociodemographic and policing
framework, the applicable capabilities of the hot spot theory will be
assessed.
In 2016, New York state ranked thirtieth out of fifty states in the
United States for the lowest murder rate, with 3.2 intentional
homicides per 100,000 residents.141 These numbers were not only
below the national average of 5.4, but also under the Northeast
regional average of 3.5.142 In 2017, New York state’s rate was that of
2.8 murders per 100,000 residents, continuing a downward trend
that had been ongoing since the State exhibited rates of 4.5 in 2010.143
This progression has left New York state’s murder rates almost
unrecognizable from the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the
standards had stabilized between 10 and 15 murders per 100,000
residents—numbers to which New York City contributed
considerably.144 During the 1990s, the rates dropped from averages
of over 14 murders per 100,000 people at the beginning of the decade
and normalized at rates that approximated 5 by the decade’s
141
Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2015-2016,
supra note 82.
142 Id. For a more focused analysis of gun violence in New York, see discussion
supra note 85.
143
Id.
144
Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2016-2017,
FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/
topic-pages/tables/table-4 [https://perma.cc/MY8S-QAMM].
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conclusion—a trend that would continue throughout the 2000s
(with rates above 4) and into the 2010s, reaching historic all-time
lows in recent years with average rates approximating 3 murders
per 100,000 individuals.145
New York City has seen an almost constant decrease in murders
throughout the last decade, achieving a murder rate of 3.9 per
100,000 residents in 2017—under the national average, but over the
regional average.146 In 2018, there were a total of 295 murders in the
city, a significant decrease of 56.17% from 673 murders in 2000, after
a historic low of 292 in 2017.147 However, most recently, this trend
appears to be destabilizing, as “[m]ore than 300 people were
murdered in 2019, [for] an increase of nearly 8% compared with
2018, and the highest number in three years, according to police
statistics.”148
In 2016, Tokyo Prefecture had a total of 80 murders, for a rate of
0.629 murders per 100,000 individuals.149 In 2017, the number of
145
Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/sevenmajor-felony-offenses-2000-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8SS-JMNG]; N.Y. STATE
DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., NEW YORK STATE CRIME REPORT (2019),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/Crime-in-NYS-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6UR-DGKP].
146 Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145.
147
Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145.
148
Edgar Sandoval, The Truth About New York’s Rising Murder Numbers, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics/nypdcrime-stats.html [https://perma.cc/B2RP-JFBR]. See also Seven Major Felony
Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145. The N.Y.P.D. has linked this uptick in murder
with gang violence. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel C. Richman, Understanding
Recent Spikes and Longer Trends in American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2017);
Ben Chapman & Katie Honan, Gang-Related Crimes Drive Up Murders, Shootings in
New York City, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gangrelated-crimes-drive-up-murders-shootings-in-new-york-city-11573080007
[https://perma.cc/MNB2-NMV8]; Ben Chapman, NYPD Says Gangs Involved in
Recent
Brooklyn
Shootings,
WALL
STREET
J.
(Aug.
6,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nypd-says-gangs-involved-in-recent-brooklynshootings-11565121460 [https://perma.cc/C5LN-DVEC]; Tina Moore & Aaron
Feis, NYC’s Murder Rate Rises Due to Gang Violence, N.Y. POST (July 10, 2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/07/10/nycs-murder-rate-rises-due-to-gang-violence/
[https://perma.cc/9MAG-4HXA]; Thomas Tracy, Gangs Tied to 49 Percent of
Shootings in New York City, Mostly Over Petty Disputes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 13,
2015),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/gangs-representshootings-new-york-city-article-1.2464740 [https://perma.cc/663A-VNW9].
149 “Hasseijyokyo/Tokei” Metropolitan Police Department Crime Statistics, TOKYO
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/smph/
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murders in Tokyo increased to 99, averaging 0.72 murders per
100,000 citizens within the city limits150—situating itself above the
national average of 0.2.151 Despite this recent slight upturn, Tokyo’s
murder rates have been continuously declining throughout recent
history—during the last decade, the total murders for the Tokyo
Prefecture stabilized between 80 and 126. 152 Although the city
places above the national average rates, Tokyo (like Osaka) made it
into the 2017 ranking of The Economist’s list of the Safe Cities Index.
Osaka occupied the third place on the list with an overall safety
score of 88.87, while Tokyo was ranked as the safest city in the world
with a score of 89.80. 153 New York is ranked twenty-first, with a
score of 81.01, and Boston does not appear in the list.154
As established in prior sections, the high-crime micro-unit
theory focuses on the recurrence of murder in specific locations and
the repeated identity of a small group of perpetrators. The section
will now proceed to analyze the extent to which the theses that this
model is predicated upon can be applied to the cities of New York
and Tokyo. To better understand both cities’ murder rates in a
broader and integrated public context, an analysis of its relationship
with selected socioeconomic indicators from New York is necessary.
In 2014, N.Y.’s metropolitan area ranked second-highest in income
inequality in the United States, behind only Connecticut. 155 As a
city, New York ranked as the tenth most affected by wealth disparity

about_mpd/jokyo_tokei/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K9S9-HMUC]
(last
visited Apr. 17, 2019).
150
See Statistics of Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department in 2017, Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Dep’t, https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/about_mpd/
jokyo_tokei/tokei/k_tokei29.files/ktd033.pdf [https://perma.cc/42HP-Y4MM]
[hereinafter 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics].
151 Intentional Homicides, supra note 7; Japan, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra
note 1.
152 Tokyo’s murder count of 126 took place in 2014 (the highest since 2008, and
until measured by this study). “Hasseijyokyo/Tokei” Metropolitan Police Department
Crime Statistics, supra note 149.
153
This ranking analyzes and measures cities’ overall safety and creates
indexes attending to indicators such as personal security, infrastructure security,
health security, and digital security. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 89.
154 Id. (regarding personal security (which includes violent crime and murder)
Osaka ranked as the 3rd safest in the world, with a score of 91.59, Tokyo ranked 4th
with a score of 91.57, and New York ranked 25th, scoring 80.89).
155 City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by Declining Incomes,
BROOKINGS INST., supra note 92.
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in the United States with a 14.1 income inequality ratio.156 In 2019,
the New York metropolitan area remained second to Bridgeport, CT,
in disproportionate capital distribution; while N.Y.C. ranked eighth
amongst American cities with an inequality rate of 14.7—following
an upward trend in wealth disparity.157 A closer look at the actual
socioeconomic divide in New York City in terms of Gini coefficients
reveals a much more complex truth, as the rates signal an inequality
that stands at 0.5136—above the already comparatively high
national average of 0.415.158 For the last decade, approximately one
in five New Yorkers have lived in relative poverty, and almost half
of the households are considered poor or living in near-poverty
conditions.159 Relative poverty rates in N.Y.C. affect roughly 20% of
the population, and are therefore higher than the national average
of 12%. 160 Two sentences that grippingly capture the levels of
inequality in N.Y.C. are the following: “One in five New Yorkers
lives below the poverty line, while the top 5% of Manhattanites
earned more than $860,000 in 2014,” 161 and “[a] census tract
bordering Central Park in the Upper East Side has a median
household income greater than $200,000, while just blocks away in
East Harlem, household income is under $16,000.”162 It is safe to
assume that New York’s wealth disparity and income inequality are
Id.
City and Metropolitan Income Inequality Data Reveal Ups and Downs Through
2016, BROOKINGS INST., supra note 94.
158
Alexandre Tanzi & Wei Lu, Income Inequality Grows in NYC Area,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-1011/have-and-the-have-nots-divide-increases-in-new-york-new-york
[https://perma.cc/Q6B7-ZWQC].
159
Wealth Divides, ESRI, https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/2016/wealthdivides/index.html [https://perma.cc/TW48-MX7N] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
160
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, N.Y. CITY GOV’T, NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT
POVERTY MEASURE 2005-2016 (2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/
pdf/18_poverty_measure_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ22-HX9R] (reporting
poverty rates by borough over various years) [hereinafter Poverty Measure 20052016]; NEW YORK MAYOR’S OFFICE FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, Poverty Measure,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/opportunity/poverty-in-nyc/poverty-measure.page
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/Q95L-3A44]; CENTER FOR NEW YORK
AFFAIRS, Inequality and Poverty, http://www.centernyc.org/inequality-poverty
[https://perma.cc/S76H-BGL9] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (explaining how wages
among low-income people in New York have stagnated); see also discussion supra
Section 2.
161
Wealth Divides, ESRI, supra note 159.
162 Id.
156
157
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substantial—and this unequal distribution of wealth is significantly
geographically determined, subject to strictly partitioned areal
demarcations.
In Manhattan, in particular in the south of the island and in the
upper east and upper west ends, yearly income per household is
generally above $100,000.163 However, in the Bronx and sectors of
Southwest Brooklyn, income tends to be under $20,000.164 In New
York City, the locations affected negatively by inequality (those in
which poverty rates and unemployment are most intense) coincide
with the geographical locus of a higher concentration of murders.165
Historical relative poverty rates in the Bronx stabilized around the
25% mark, reaching 27.5% in 2015. 166 In Brooklyn, these rates
peaked for the decade in 2012, with 22.3% poverty; decreasing to
20.5% households in poverty in 2016.167 Comparatively, Manhattan
had poverty rates of 13.9% that same year.168
Like poverty, unemployment in New York City tends to
accumulate in sectors of Brooklyn and the Bronx as well. After
reaching levels of over 10% consequent to the 2008 economic
collapse, unemployment in N.Y.C. is now stable at around 4%.169
Labor inactivity rates for the city are comparable to national
averages, though they are lower than the regional average, which in
2019 settled at about 10%. 170 The Bronx and Brooklyn show
unemployment rates above the city average, but lower than that of
the regional average.
In 2014 the Bronx suffered 10%
unemployment, which descended to 7.1% in 2016, and in 2019 rested

163 See Andy Kiersz, Here’s a Block-By-Block Look at Who’s Making How Much
Across NYC’s 5 Boroughs, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.business
insider.com/new-york-city-income-maps-2014-12
[https://perma.cc/U3QNM2EQ] [hereinafter NYC Block-by-Block Look].
164 Id.
165 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, infra note 181; discussion supra note 22.
166
Poverty Measure 2005-2016, supra note 160.
167
See Poverty Measure 2005-2016, supra note 160.
168
See Poverty Measure 2005-2016, supra note 160.
169
Labor Statistics for the New York City Region: Revised 2014-2018 Borough Labor
Force
Data,
N.Y.
ST.,
https://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/nyc/
[https://perma.cc/SAK3-LN2H] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (listing basic labor
statistics for N.Y.C. over various years).
170
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: 2018 ANNUAL SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT, www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/
cpsmar18.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRX5-TXKA] (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
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at 5.6%. 171 In Brooklyn, a county that doubles the Bronx in
population and exhibits more economic diversity, unemployment
rates have descended from around 8% in 2014, to an average of 4.2%
in 2018.172 The areas of N.Y.C. where the most murders occur are
the areas most affected by inequality, including certain parts of the
Bronx and Brooklyn which in turn exhibit the lowest income and the
This data shows higher
highest unemployment rates. 173
unemployment rates in murder-concentration areas than in the
comprehensive city dynamics, though absent significant contrast;
and it also signals a continuous descent, which has generally been
accompanied by a decline in murder rates as well.174
Though crime rates are the highest in the “Manhattan South
Precinct,” most are against property—only two murders occurred
throughout 2018 in this location. This pattern resembles Osaka’s
Chūō-ku district with its high-in-crime but low-in-murder trends.175
In New York City, murder locations are both progressively reducing
and, unlike in Osaka, consolidating. In recent years, many precincts
in New York have had between 0 and 2 murders. However, there
are certain precincts that report disproportionate murder rates.176
As stated above, murders in N.Y.C. are concentrated
geographically in very specific locations,177 and these locations also
tend to be the areas of the city most affected by inequality. 178
Murder is intensively condensed in areas of the Bronx and areas of
Southwest Brooklyn. The Bronx precincts, in 2018, saw 81 of the

171 Labor Statistics for the New York City Region: Revised 2014-2018 Borough Labor
Force Data, supra note 169.
172 Id.
173 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, infra note 181; NYC Block-by-Block Look, supra note
163.
174 The recurring nature of this data point in the U.S., Boston, and N.Y.C., may
suggest that employed people (or people with access to a stable, legal source of
income) are less likely to participate in murder. Id. See also discussion infra note 207.
175 See discussion supra Section 3.2.
176
Seven Major Felony Offenses: By Precinct 2000-2019, N.Y.P.D.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/h
istorical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-by-precinct-2000-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WE95-2W99].
177 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, infra note 181; NYC Block-by-Block Look, supra note
163.
178 Id.
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city’s 252 total murders. 179 This means that 32% of the murders
occurred in the Bronx, where only 17% of the population lives.180 In
particular, the 42nd, 48th, 32nd, and 40th police precincts recorded
murder rates per 100,000 individuals of 18.81, 15.61, 16.92, and 13.12
respectively, specifically conglomerating in Belmont and East
Tremont (which suffer poverty rates of 30.3%) and areas between
Concourse and High Bridge (sustaining poverty rates of 32.4%).181
Accompanying these northern Harlem and Bronx precincts in
murder concentration rates is a small cluster of precincts within
South Brooklyn. In this area, 5 out of the 133 city-wide precincts
accounted for 16% of all murders in 2018—specifically affected were
the 77th, 73rd, and 79th precincts, with respective murder rates of
18.73, 18.5, and 15.51 murders per 100,000 individuals. 182 These
murders cluster in areas of Crown Heights and Brownsville, which
suffer the highest poverty rates in Brooklyn with 29.4%.183 A quick
glance at crime maps provided by the New York City Government
provides an insightful understanding of how disproportionate the
situation is in terms of the geographical accumulation of murder,
and how it correlates with geographically-demarcated inequality.184
Unlike New York, Tokyo shows some of the same tendencies as
Osaka: murders are spread throughout the city and do not seem to
attend to socioeconomic disparities manifested in the form of
wealth. First, while New York’s disparity is heavily dependent
upon geographical conditions, Tokyo does not have the same
179
Id. See also Precincts, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/
bureaus/patrol/precincts-landing.page [https://perma.cc/Y8HR-4GKC] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2019); Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145.
180 In 2018, 1,432,132 people lived in the Bronx, out of the City’s 8,398,748 total
residents. QuickFacts: Bronx County Bronx Borough), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bronxcountybronxboroughnewy
ork/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/MRX5-TXKA] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
181
These rates are calculated for dates between January 2019 and April 2020,
in accordance to the N.Y.C. Crime Map statistics provided by N.Y.C.. N.Y.C. Crime
Map, CITY N.Y. https://maps.nyc.gov/crime/ [https://perma.cc/SRQ6-BVQ8].
For a contrastive analysis, see the data provided by the city’s Office for Economic
Opportunity. CITY OF N.Y., NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT POVERTY MEASURE (2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/19_poverty_measure_report.pd
f [https://perma.cc/7KX2-PXAF].
182
Id.
183 Id.
184
See N.Y.C. Crime Map, supra note 181. However, unlike Boston, murders
tend to congregate around the areas most affected by inequality in general, and not
necessarily specific streets. For the analyzed time-frames, geolocational repetition
is scarce.
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cleavages in income by district.185 Residential inequalities by district
that provoke socioeconomic segregation are absent as a result of
coordinated capitalism, state and urban policy, and work-location
and commute patterns. 186 This is not to say that there are not
districts that house the wealthy in Tokyo. There are indeed income
inequalities that represent themselves through district and ward
lines. However, the differential element of inequality is not based
strictly on the district in which the residents live rather how much
space their houses occupy within the district, 187 creating a
socioeconomically integrated urban wealth network that is unlike
the heavily economically partitioned New York. Pertaining to the
historical trajectory of inequality, wealth disparity amongst districts
has grown in recent years in both New York and Tokyo, but to a
different degree. While income inequality between boroughs
doubled in New York between 1970 and 2000, Tokyo’s inequality
among districts grew only 16%.188 Japan is the biggest economy in
the world with the “most equal wealth distribution,”189 and Tokyo
follows the same conceptual pattern as a city.
The city analysis of inequality in New York and Tokyo reveals
similar patterns as laid out by national trends in the United States
and Japan respectively. New York, like the United States, exhibits
an incremental and linear trend towards increased inequality; while
in Tokyo, like in Japan, the trend is cyclical and not attached to
specific geographical delineations, reflective of a more economically
uniform Japanese society. 190 Inequality in Tokyo becomes most
185 RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: MAKING SENSE OF
CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY (Thomas Maloutas & Kuniko Fujita eds., 2012).
186
Residential patterns are necessary when establishing the differences
between New York’s economic segregation and the comparatively lesser
socioeconomic partitions encountered in Tokyo’s geolocation of wealth and
poverty. Id.
187 Id.
188 Kuniko Fujita & Richard Child Hill, Place Stratification in Tokyo and New
York, MICH. ST. U. (2006), https://msu.edu/user/hillrr/Place%20Stratification%20
Tokyo%20and%20New%20York.pdf [https://perma.cc/N94B-KU5L] (discussing
urban class segregation in Tokyo and New York). These discrepancies can also be
associated to other factors like cost of living variability, among others.
189
CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INST., GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 2018 48 (2018),
[https://perma.cc/LQN4-9JZD] (analyzing the economies and relative wealth of
several of the world’s major economies, establishing that “Japan has a more equal
wealth distribution than any other major country”).
190 Fujita & Hill, Place Stratification in Tokyo and New York, supra note 188.
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apparent when comparing the center of the city with the suburbs.
This means that inequality among districts within the city is not as
significant as the variance found when the city is compared to its
metropolitan area, a capital wealth discrepancy that has expanded
in recent years. Income inequality ratio between the city center and
the suburbs of Tokyo has increased from 118% to 137% wealth
accumulation disparity during this decade, 191 though these
numbers are still nowhere near the inequality ratios found in New
York, where a couple blocks can signify a rupturing distance
between poverty and capital wealth. 192 In essence, on matters
pertaining to inequality, the main difference that Tokyo presents
with New York is that, while in New York geographical areas are
populated by either the rich or the poor, Tokyo’s inequality is not
as pronounced and is not as dependent upon geographical
boundaries. Tokyo has a social structure in which the inhabitants of
its residential wards are more socioeconomically integrated
throughout districts and amongst occupational groups.193
Moving on to unemployment in Tokyo, rates are currently
stabilized at 2%—lower than the national average of 2.5%.194 This
follows a positive trend as the city responded to the 2008 economic
crisis with an unemployment response that reached 5.5% in 2010.195
There has been a constant decline in labor inactivity in the city since
the disruptive effects of the economic downturn, with 2016 seeing a
3.2% unemployment rate. 196 In the same way that income per
household does not abruptly diverge by district, Tokyo presents
more balanced unemployment rates per district than New York.
Regarding governmental support of the poor, the Tokyo Prefecture,
like Osaka, required welfare distribution at a higher rate than the
national average. The number of Tokyoites who received welfare
191 Maloutas & Fujita, supra note 185. See generally James Mayger & Hannah
Dormido, The Rich Are Getting Richer in Abe’s Japan, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-japan-inequality/
[https://perma.cc/DUR5-39EY].
192 Wealth Divides, ESRI, supra note 159. See also discussion supra note 188.
193 Fujita & Hill, supra note 188.
194 “Tokyonoroudouryoku” Employment in Tokyo, Statistics of Tokyo, STAT. DIV.
BUREAU GEN. AFF., http://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.jp/roudou/rd-index.htm
[http://perma.cc/4KFD-WHGP] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
195 Id.
196 Id. (showing 2014’s increased unemployment rate would coincide with the
only growth in murder rates, increasing nationwide from 370 to 395, then reducing
again in 2015 to 363 and in 2016 to 362).
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was 21.2 per 1,000 while the national average was 16.4. 197
Nonetheless, the need for welfare distribution was relatively
consistent across Tokyo’s districts.198
When observing murder counts as a function of the districts in
which they occurred, it becomes apparent again that, like Osaka and
unlike Boston and New York, Tokyo’s murders do not strongly
correspond with socioeconomic indexing elements or their
corresponding sociodemographic divides. In other words, murder
geolocation in Tokyo is not determined by socioeconomic district or
neighborhood lines like it is in New York. Tokyo’s District 7 has the
most murders in the city, but it is also geographically the largest,
and not disproportionate in terms of income, welfare needs, or
unemployment when compared with the rest of the city’s districts.
It is followed in total murder count by District 3 with 13 murders,
District 6 (11), District 2 (10), District 10 (9), District 4 (7), District 1
(6), and District 5 (5).199 These murder rates appear proportional to
size and population density, and do not appear to be
disproportionately affected or conditioned by socioeconomic
dynamics. 200 District 10 and District 6 have the highest rates of
welfare recipients in Tokyo, and their murder rates sit amongst the
districts’ average. Meanwhile, District 3 is overall the most
socioeconomically privileged and least affected by inequality in that
its residents receive below average government assistance in all its
composing neighborhoods,201 and yet it has more murders than both
District 10 and District 6. In other words, District 3, which receives
comparatively low governmental subsidies and includes the third,
sixth, and seventh wealthiest wards, out of 23 total, has a higher
murder rate than districts with socioeconomic indicators that reflect
higher indexes of poverty.202 This challenges the patterns observed
in New York and Boston, cities in which the location of murder is
associated with areas that are more affected by inequality. These
observations also confirm the patterns observed in Osaka, where
See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110.
Id.
199 See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150.
200 Id.
201 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra
note 150.
202 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra
note 150.
197
198
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murders do not ascribe to socioeconomic beacons of poverty or
unemployment. As a useful representation of this dissonance, in
Tokyo, the highest concentration of wealth based on average income
per household is in District 1, which includes Minato, Chiyoda, and
Chuo wards.203 This does not mean that murder disappears entirely
or are abruptly reduced in comparison to other areas of the city, like
it tends to signify in New York. Murder rates in District 1 actually
remain similar to city averages—suggesting again that murders are
not determined by the status of geographically demarcated
socioeconomic inferences. Another example that corroborates this
hypothesis can be found by digging deeper into the information
provided by the case of Tokyo’s District 6.
Some of the
neighborhoods with the least income per household are located in
this area. This district is formed by Adachi, the ward with the lowest
income per household; Arakawa, which ranks twentieth out of
Tokyo’s 23 total wards in total wealth per household; and Taito,
which ranks sixteenth. 204 District 6 is geographically large and
receives a higher than average proportion of welfare. Yet, there
were only 11 murders throughout the district of the total 80 murders
in the city in 2017, indicating a lack of concentration in communities
affected by inequality like in the Bronx and Southwest Brooklyn.205
Police distribution in this Tokyo district is also geographically
interspersed and, unlike in Boston, police geolocation does not
appear to correspond to an area’s income. District 6 has 84 koban,
compared to District 1’s 76, or District 5’s 44 koban.206
The analysis of New York and Tokyo provides similar results as
that of Boston and Osaka. Murders in New York, like in Boston are
concentrated in the neighborhoods most affected by inequality,
while in Tokyo, like in Osaka, murders do not seem to attend to, or
be as determined by, geographically-conditioned socioeconomic
divisions. N.Y.C. conveys signals that it is becoming increasingly
dissimilar in wealth parity and geographical distribution of
income—following the same trend as the United States—and with
this increase in geographically determined inequality, murders
continue to concentrate in the areas most affected by poverty and
203 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra
note 150.
204 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; Housing and Land Survey in 2013,
MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. & COMM., www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Xlsdl.do?sinfid=
000028112135.
205
See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150.
206 Id.
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unemployment. However, it is worth mentioning for clarity
purposes that in N.Y.C., this last factor is less determinative than in
Boston; unemployment rates in the communities in which murders
are disproportionately perpetrated in New York are higher, but not
as significantly as they are in Boston.207
The hot spot theory suggests that the analysis of murders must
be focused on individual streets and that murders are perpetrated
by a particularly small group of recurring individuals. The analysis
of New York and Tokyo partially disproves the multi-city
applicability of both elements of this theory. This Paper will first
attend to the initial micro-unit thesis prong: geographical
concentration of murder. New York responds to the same
archetypal murder concentration as Boston, but seemingly
attending to different levels of micro-unit intensity and dispersing
into broader areal progressions.
Though not an absolute
contravention of the micro-unit thesis, the data presents further
pertinency and potential policy value in attending to a
macroeconomic and dispersed-scale socioeconomic-groupings
approach to murder, rather than adjusting to a micro-locational lens
for the purposes of addressing the underlying influencing elements
to murder. In confirmation of the micro-unit thesis, murders in
N.Y.C. appear to be progressively and disproportionately clustering
into specific precincts, in particular within the areas most affected
by inequality.
Tokyo’s data, like Osaka’s, does not leave space for the salvaging
of potential direct applicability regarding the first prong of the
micro-unit theory. Murder in Tokyo occurs in a widespread manner
throughout the city in a way that remains unresponsive to
socioeconomic divergences. Unlike in N.Y.C., murder patterns in
Tokyo do not respond to geo-specific socioeconomic disparity
inferences, and this may be due to the fact that the city is not as
socioeconomically divided—both regarding general affectations of
inequality as well as the geographical allocation of inequality.
Indirectly, however, Tokyo’s murder data does not necessarily
imply a comprehensive failure of the hot spots theory. With
significantly lower murder rates among all districts, the hot spots
thesis holds potential value in that Tokyo, like Osaka, may be
207
This brings into question matters not only of unemployment, but of the
quality of employment available in these geographical enclaves, paired with
educational restrictions and other accompanying sociodemographic factors.
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evidence that the problems affecting Boston’s and New York City’s
comparatively high and geographically condensed murder rates can
be resolved through appropriate policy design and effective
implementation. Just because murder is not as quantitatively
significant or intensely concentrated in the selected Japanese cities,
this does not mean that it cannot or could not be. The current state
of murder in Tokyo could be conveying that the pertinent policy
authorities and the police have resolved the issues of murder
quantity and concentration through appropriate and efficient
deployment of their capacities, or that social public policies may
have averted excessive pockets of socioeconomic inequality,
addressing an underlying causative foundation of murder. In this
regard, the suitability of the theory may entail that Tokyo is ahead
of the policy curve, and the city may have addressed the
geographical micro-unit problem before it arose by (i) enacting
policies dedicated to averting socioeconomic inequality or at least
preventing capital disparity from being intensely area-specific, and
(ii) spreading its police resources as community-focused safety
services throughout the city in a comparatively pervasive manner,
allowing officers to become a part of the communities’ social fabric.
The second theoretical proposal of the hot spot doctrine is that a
very small group of individuals will execute most of the gun
violence and commit most of the murders. This is not the case in
New York to the extent it is in Boston. A 2010 report issued by the
New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision quantified recidivism rates as follows: only 38% of
people who were imprisoned for their crime returned to prison in
N.Y.C.208 The rates within the city were the lowest in the state, as
upstate New York had recidivism standards of up to 49%.209 The
crime with the lowest recidivism rate in N.Y.C. was murder with
13%, followed by manslaughter at 17%. 210 In the case of Tokyo,
recidivism is minimal and follows the general pattern found in
Japanese national criminal statistics. Recidivism is almost nonexistent in Japan—by 2005, only five of the prior 1,768 murder cases

Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Return Rate
for Parolees Committing New Felony Crimes Hits Historic Low (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/PressRel/2014/Recidivism_Rates_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D42V-5P9Y]
209 Id.
210 Id.
208
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presented recidivism, which was less than 0.3%.211 In Tokyo, for the
99 murders documented in 2017, 98 different people were
arrested.212 This data suggests that murder in New York and Tokyo,
unlike in Boston, is perpetrated by a varying group of individuals.
Another differential element between Boston and Tokyo which may
help explain the inapplicability of the hot spot theory to Tokyo is
that of the underlying human capital patterns to murder and their
adjacent criminal motivation. Perhaps in Boston the high-crime
micro-unit theory is useful because of the purpose of the crime, in
concomitance with its natural geographically conglomerative
tendencies. Gang associations and their derivative violence, which
the hot spot theory directly points to as a major source of murder,
are highly concentrated and involve perpetrators operating in
intensively concentric geographical spaces and social circles.
However, in Tokyo, perpetrators do not operate in concentrated
geographical spaces, nor do offenders participate in multiple acts of
murder. This may indicate a less significant presence of gang
activity, a less condensed areal presence of gang activity, or a
detachment between gang activity and murder. In turn, this
potentially signifies that gang activity may be less overall, be less
visible or impactful on social violence, or that the result of gang
activity does not manifest in the form of intentional homicide.
A major structural difference that emanates from both cities’
analysis is the divergence among geographical presence of police. A
police infrastructural comparison between Tokyo and New York
reveals the same pattern as that of Boston and Osaka—a
significantly more integrated police presence in Tokyo than what is
found in New York. While New York has 133 precincts, Tokyo
police spreads its roots deep into every neighborhood with a total of
1,183 koban. 213 The objective of this profound geographical
pervasiveness, not only in Tokyo but throughout Japan, is that of
developing community policing. Community policing creates a
Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra note 6, at 334.
See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150.
213 “Keishichoudehatarakutowa” Working with the Metropolitan Police Department,
TOKYO METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/
saiyo/31/about/no1.html [https://perma.cc/DQ5L-PPZJ] (last visited Apr. 17,
2019). See also Precincts, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/
patrol/precincts-landing.page [https://perma.cc/EB7D-DNCS] (last visited Apr.
24, 2019); Seven Major Felony Offenses: By Precinct 2000-2019, N.Y.P.D., supra note
176; NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 7.
211
212
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nexus of identity between individuals and their neighborhood
police officers, which provides for an integrated and cohesive
conceptualization between police roles and the socioeconomic
interactions of the communities they participate in and serve. 214
Though the New York Police Department has made tremendous
efforts to pursue similar goals and obtain similar results through its
neighborhood policing program, “One City: Safe and Fair—
Everywhere,”215 and “build the block” initiatives,216 the difference
between both nations’ police networks remains predicated upon the
geographical ubiquity of the Japanese koban against the relatively
isolated nature of the U.S. police station. It is entirely possible that,
among other factors, the initiatives deployed in New York City in
pursuit of community policing have contributed to the steady
decline in the city’s murder rates. However, the New York police
still lack the geographical dispersion found in Japan, which may
present barriers to community-policing and its attached social
integration.
New York’s state of murder presents a more analogous
archetype to Braga et al.’s theory than that displayed by Japan’s
cities, revealing an inherent intra-cultural consistency. Murders in
Tokyo remain comparatively lower than both Boston’s and New
York’s, occurring throughout the city’s landscape, and presenting
almost non-existent recidivism. The structural differences found by
this Paper’s contrastive analysis are related to the spatial
dissemination and distributive configuration of police resources,
214 The notion of integrated community policing will be further developed in
Section 4.
215
In 2015, Mayor de Blasio announced the constitution of a program
projected as a “comprehensive approach designed to fully engage community as
coequal partner to keep neighborhoods safe, support officers, and keep crime at
historic low levels.” The specific strategies set forth by these policies pursue
community-building through, for example, the “true sector integrity” concept,
which delegates “the same two officers” to “the same sector every day with the
potential for an additional two regularly-assigned cars depending on the sector’s
crime rates.” These policies appear to echo Japanese designs in seeking a deeper
integration between police and community networks. See Mayor de Blasio,
Commissioner Bratton Unveil New Groundbreaking Neighborhood Policing Vision,
N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/440-15/mayor-deblasio-commissioner-bratton-new-groundbreaking-neighborhood-policingvision#/0 [https://perma.cc/W9RX-8MKG].
216
Neighborhood Policing, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/
bureaus/patrol/neighborhood-coordination-officers.page
[https://perma.cc/EB7D-DNCS] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Find Your Build the
Block Meeting, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/findyour-meeting.page [https://perma.cc/KRX3-DG4L] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
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and the areal-disjunctive effects of geographically-consolidated
inequality. The Japanese cities analyzed in this study present
community-focused safety services equitably and ubiquitously
engrained in their neighborhood infrastructural network, and
remain largely unburdened by the complex socioeconomic and
geodemographic inequities present in their U.S. counterparts. And
it is amidst the neighborhoods most affected by New York’s
comparatively aggressive wealth disparity that murders
accumulate, and so do the tragic stories that they bring with them.217
Without the intent to extrapolate conclusions regarding the
dynamics of socioeconomic factors, comparative wealth, and their
interactions with police murder-prevention activity, this Paper
poses the following premise in order to anticipate and preclude
murder as the act of an individual, as well as murder as a social
doing. Given the recurring nature of unemployment, relative
poverty, and geodemographically-segregated wealth inequality as
correlative indicators of higher murder rates in the U.S., and how
the lessened intensity and geographical concentration of these
elements in Japan appear to signal macro and micro-level reductions
in murder rates, it could be projected that access to labor, which
provides individuals with steady sources of income and with social
affiliations that disconnect violence (and its consequent murder)
from capital acquisition, its consequence in wealth attainment
through lawful means, and its effects on factual and perceived
geographically-based wealth disparity, may be useful avenues
through which to approach murder prevention targeted at the
individual commission of the crime. Alongside these subjectfocused murder prevention strategies, community-focused safety
services’ ubiquity and integrated neighborhood geographical
presence, may act as an aggregate socially preventive layer.218 As a
consequence to the data gathered in this comparative study, it
appears that individuals with the structural capability to access a
stable source of legally-sanctioned income may be less likely to
participate in murder compared to those who exist within a system
with more geographically-determined inequality and nonintegrated wealth distribution patterns. In combination with an
equal and integrated distribution of safety-related services these
217
Criminal conglomeration has effects beyond those that are statistical, and
it seeps into more complex social-conditioning networks.
218
The nexus between community policing and the potential implementation
of a Japanese-style koban model will be addressed further in Section 4.
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policies seem conducive to more efficient murder-prevention
strategies, less concentrated murder patterns, lower rates of
recidivism, and lower murder rates overall.
4.

CONCLUSIONS, POLICE ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Road to Reducing Murder Rates: Socioeconomic Integration and
Geographical Redistribution of Safety and Conflict-Resolution Resources
In analyzing Boston’s murder patterns, the high-crime microunit (or “hot spot”) theory infers from them that (i) murders are and
will be substantially and fundamentally geographically
concentrated, and (ii) that murders will be committed by a small
recurring number of individuals. The hot spot thesis may have
profoundly useful applications in projecting and anticipating
murders in Boston; however, its potential for extrapolation to other
cities’ states of murder seems to be rather limited due to two main
hindrances that arise from its arguments. First, it is insufficiently
explanatory; and second, as a result, it lacks inter-city and multicultural translatability.
The theory’s lack of explanatory value can be found both at a
geographical level as well as in relation to perpetrator concentration.
The hot spot thesis does not provide insight as to why extreme
murder concentration takes place in Boston, or why a concentric and
reiterative group of people perpetrates the vast majority of the
murders.219 This renders the micro-unit premise a potentially useful
reactionary tool to respond to projected iterations of crime, but fails
to address the underlying causality of the crime itself, making its
applicability in divergent sociocultural or geodemographic contexts
219
The hot spot theory provides an indirect—though insufficient—
explanatory thesis to murder as it relates murder to gang activity and gang activity
to youths in socioeconomically depressed parts of Boston. However, deferring to
at-risk youth does not contribute towards murder resolution in its underlying
causality. It is worth mentioning too that the World Bank has identified a worldwide youth violence problem, in particular in areas exposed to high inequality and
poverty, and with high unemployment among said youth, which may incline them
to risky behavior such as crime. WENDY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE WORLD BANK,
SUPPORTING YOUTH AT RISK A POLICY TOOLKIT FOR MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 30
(2008), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/514781468175152614/pdf/
437050WP0ENGLI1YouthAtRisk01PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L55A-TKZB];
Urban Violence: A Challenge of Epidemic Proportions, WORLD BANK (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/09/06/urban-violence-achallenge-of-epidemic-proportions [https://perma.cc/87KK-7ECW].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/5

2020]

Comparative Analysis of Murder Rates

861

inefficient. A comparative analysis between the conclusions derived
from Boston’s state of murder, and those presented by the cities of
New York, Osaka, and Tokyo reveals that the thesis cannot be
directly expanded into each city’s murder context.
In both Boston and New York, crime in general,220 and murder
in particular, tends to concentrate in areas disproportionately
affected by inequality—areas which exhibit high rates of poverty
and unemployment. Inequality in Boston and New York is heavily
demarcated by neighborhood, and it is within the less
socioeconomically privileged neighborhoods that murder tends to
cluster and consolidate. Moderately varying from Boston’s hyperlocalized state of murder, but ascribing to the same archetypal
principles, the geographical location of intentional homicides in
New York is heavily localized in specific neighborhoods within the
Bronx and Southwest Brooklyn—those most markedly affected by
socioeconomic disparity. Pertaining to the perpetrator prong of the
theory, the commission of murder by cohesive and reiterative
groups in Boston is comparatively higher than that of New York.
While in Boston half the murders are committed by 1% of the city’s
population, New York’s murder recidivism rates are below the
regional average at 13%, which partially refutes the micro-unit
thesis.221
220
In New York, the precinct with the most amount of reported crime is the
Manhattan South District, which includes Times Square (a commercial/touristic
area), but these crimes tend to be property-related, given the commercial nature of
the precinct. This same pattern is repeated in Osaka’s Chūō-ku, which includes
Minami (an equally commercial/touristic area). This could signal an “overflow”
effect by which crimes and murders that would be committed in Japan’s poorest
neighborhoods are expulsed to adjacent districts. However, the pervasive and
equal nature of murders throughout the districts, the almost non-existent
recidivism rates, and the lack of connection between murder and cohesive criminal
group activity, seems to refute this potential hypothesis. See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
221
However, this data point exclusively focuses on murder—whereas the
micro-unit thesis, in its analysis of recidivist gun violence perpetrators in Boston,
seems to have uncovered within Boston a trend that is much grander in scope. Gun
violence comprehensively, at a national level, has significantly higher recidivism
rates than other offenses, especially when compared to non-gun crimes. The United
States Sentencing Commission found in a 2019 study that firearm offenders
recidivate faster (with a median of 17 months for firearm offenders, compared to 22
months for non-firearm offenders) and at significantly higher rates than nonfirearm offenders (68.1% for firearm offenders, compared to 46.3% for non-firearm
offenders). Anthony J. Annucci, Return Rate for Parolees Committing New Felony
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An analysis of the state of murder in Tokyo and Osaka presents
a near-antithetical narrative to that projected by the micro-unit
model, and beyond the scope of what the theory seems to be able to
directly accomplish. Delving into the specifics of murder and its
interrelation with geographic and perpetrator factors, the story that
unfolds in the selected Japanese cities is radically different than that
encountered in the United States. Murders in Tokyo and Osaka are
quantitatively lower and (i) are not concentrated in any particular
neighborhood, being much more ubiquitously distributed
throughout the geographic landscape of the selected cities, and (ii)
are not committed by a converging, coordinated, or concentric
group of perpetrators.
First, pertaining to murder areal
concentration, no one geographic nucleus absorbs a
disproportionate amount of the murder cases in Osaka or Tokyo like
Dorchester does in Boston or the Bronx does in New York. In fact,
Nishinari, the Osaka neighborhood most affected by inequality, has
a relatively low murder rate compared to other nearby districts,
even when contrasted with the city’s wealthier wards. This pattern
remains true for Tokyo’s state of murder.
Much like the
geographical element of the high-crime micro-unit thesis, the
offender element prong has no possible application in Japan. 222
Crimes Hits Historic Low, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.doccs.ny.gov/
PressRel/2014/Recidivism_Rates_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D42V-5P9Y]; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL FIREARMS OFFENDERS 4 (2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-publications/2019/20190627_Recidivism_Firearms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FC6-XWKC].
222
Regarding the purely firearm-related element of the analysis, it is worth
noting that Japan and the United States exist in almost antithetical realms. In Japan,
in 2017, there were 60 gun-related criminal incidents country-wide—with only 9 of
them ending in fatality. In the U.S., that same year, there were almost 11,000
murders perpetrated with firearms, almost three quarters of the more than 15,000
total murder-count, and this is just a measure of murder by itself, not gun violence
comprehensively. Focusing this particular analysis at a city level, and returning to
New York and Tokyo, firearm presence exhibits the same traits as it does at each
national level. In New York, there were 1,288 victims of shootings in 2018. In
Tokyo, there were 0. One would have to go back to 2015 to find an incident of gun
violence in Tokyo, and then would only encounter two reports of robbery at
gunpoint. To find a gun-related murder, one would have to dig into 2014 data, a
year in which 3 murders were perpetrated with guns in Tokyo (of the nationwide 4
total gun murders that year). Needless to say, with such low rates of general
recidivism (and specific murder recidivism), in combination with the remarkably
low national and regional gun violence and its consequent gun murder rates, the
hot spots theory perpetrator prong is not directly applicable to the state of murder
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Recidivism rates in the Nippon nation are statistically insignificant,
as only five cases from 1,768 murders measured presented
recidivism (less than 0.3%). 223 Furthermore, police in both Osaka
and Tokyo tend to arrest different individuals for every murder case
within their jurisdictions.224 In other words, in Japan almost every
iteration of murder is adjudicated to a different individual,
suggesting that murder in Osaka and Tokyo, unlike in Boston, is
perpetrated by a varying and non-cohesive group of individuals.
In the selected U.S. cities, inequality appears heavily demarcated
and conditioned by geodemographic factors, and subject to strict
areal dissociation. In Osaka and Tokyo, inequality indexes,
unemployment, and poverty are not disproportionately
concentrated by geographical or neighborhood delineations.
Inequality is much less pronounced in general in the selected
Japanese cities than in their U.S. counterparts, and it does not
observe rigid census tract demarcations.
In examining the
geographic and perpetrator concentration of murder in its
relationship with socioeconomic disparity, the inter-city multicultural analysis reveals that in the selected U.S. cities inequality
concentrates in specific locations, and so does murder congregate in
coinciding geographical spaces and perpetrator conditions; whereas
in Japan, where inequality (i) is not as pronounced, and (ii) is not as
geographically determined, murders occur with much less
frequency, without areal concentration throughout the city, and
with the absence of concentric perpetrator groups. From the
contrastive analysis of the state of murder and socioeconomic
disparity in the selected U.S. and Japanese cities, it can be inferred
that there is a relationship between geographically-demarcated
in Japan. This Paper recognizes that gun violence and its underlying firearm
regulatory framework are structurally different in the U.S. and Japan, and that both
could potentially be substantially effectful variables in regard to murder rates and
police relations. See NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 30.
Expanded Homicide Data Table 8: Murder Victims by Weapon 2013-2017, FBI: UCR,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/
tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-8.xls [perma.cc/EJ89-B77Y]; Compstat 2.0,
N.Y.P.D., https://compstat.nypdonline.org/2e5c3f4b-85c1-4635-83c6-22b27fe7c7
5c/view/89 [https://perma.cc/MP2V-NDXF] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019);
“Hasseijyokyo/Tokei” Metropolitan Police Department Crime Statistics, supra note 149.
223 See discussion supra Section 3.2.
224 In 2017, there were 99 murders in Tokyo and 98 different people arrested;
and in Osaka 106 murders, with 103 different individuals arrested. See discussion
supra Sections 3.2, 3.3.
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inequality and murder concentration—both in terms of its location
and its perpetrators.
The analytic component of this conclusion does not intend to
claim that unemployment, poverty, or their derivative inequality
necessarily produce higher murder rates. However, it does
conclude that, in the United States, these factors—in combination—
accompany and mirror them macro and micro-geographically. U.S.
historical national murder rates are volatile, and their variability
shares a correlative path that tends to emulate (or be emulated by)
unemployment and poverty trends; while micro-geographically
murders tend to accumulate in areas most negatively affected by
inequality. In Japan, however, national trends in unemployment
and poverty appear not to affect murder rates, which maintain a
steady, continuous, and seemingly inexorable decline unaffected by
cyclical socioeconomic changes—both at national and microlocational analytic scope. The fact that no particular neighborhood
seems to be specifically or disproportionately affected by inequality
does not allow for conclusions on whether this socioeconomic
indicator can be related to murder. However, the exceptions to the
inequality rule, including Nishinari in Osaka and Districts 3 and 6
in Tokyo, suggest that, in the selected Japanese cities, socioeconomic
indexes do not share a strict correlation with murder rates, even in
the areas most affected by socioeconomic inequality.225 From the
data gathered by this study, it can be inferred that lessened systemic

225
Some scholars have established that this may be due to the fact that the
motivation for murder in Japan tends to be mainly social status or pride (except for
the anomalous and progressively disappearing cases of organized crime), which
contrasts sharply with Braga et al.’s characterization of murder in the U.S., which
they determine to be heavily related to gang activity. However, it is worth noting
that Japan’s murder motivations are overwhelmingly based on status (constituting
approximately 60% of murder motivations in contemporary times), business and
money (approximately 15%), jealousy (approximately 10%), self-defense (3%). It is
worth noting that in post-war Japan, the people most affected by inequality were
still overrepresented in the commission of killings. Between 1955 and 1963,
individuals classified as “very poor” constituted 6.25% of the general population,
while committing 6.97% of the murders; individuals under the classification of
“poor” constituted 25.9 of the population, while committing 61.3% of homicides;
40.1% of the population was classified as “moderate,” and committed 30.8% of the
murders; 20.6% of the people were categorized as “affluent” and committed 0.88%
of homicides; and “very affluent” individuals constituted 7.15% of the general
population, while committing 0.03% of homicides. See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra
note 6, at 336, 338; Braga et al., supra note 2 (detailing the causes and purposes
underlying murder in Boston and in Japan).
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and geographically-determined socioeconomic disparity may be a
contributing factor to lower murder rates.
In addition to the socioeconomic differences between the United
States and Japan, there is an additional structural divergence that
can be found between the nations’ states of murder: the
geographical allocation of police resources. This difference is
predicated upon the geolocation of the police within the city
infrastructure, and the social consequences in functionality that
occur as a result. The difference between these two policy elements
is at the heart of the proposals of this Paper: the potential
implications for murder prevention of policies directed at (i)
diminishing geographically-determined inequality through
socioeconomic areal integration, and (ii) ubiquitous redistributive
reallocation of police resources and other safety, conflict-resolution,
and
murder-preventive
services,
accompanied
by
a
reconceptualization of their purpose.226
Police presence is structurally different in the United States and
Japan, as it is in the cities selected for this study. In Boston, there are
12 police stations. In New York, 133 precincts. In Osaka, there are
649 koban, and in Tokyo 1,183. The policy observation that this
Paper puts forth is the following: one of the reasons Japanese police
are so effective is their ubiquitous geographic location and insertion
of the police into the social fabric of the communities they serve.
This legitimizes the police force as a resource dedicated to
community safety and conflict resolution rather than establishing
itself as an external and intrusive force. The conceptualization of
police forces is also different in both nations: Japanese police boxes
are located every few blocks and are227 populated with three to five
officers who are integrated members of the communities they serve.
Not only does this seem to have high correlative values in what
pertains to murder deterrence, but it seems that Japan falls almost
by default into community-policing as a consequence of its inclusive
police resource geospatial structure within the larger city
226
The high-crime micro-unit hypothesis can be utilized as a lens through
which to focalize the effective deployment of integration and conflict-resolution
resource reallocation policies.
227 See discussion supra Sections 3.2, 3.3; "Koban" in New York City?, CONSULATE
GEN. JAPAN N.Y. (2016), https://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/japaninfo/
spring2016/04.html [https://perma.cc/ST7W-36FW] (noting that as of 2016, there
were approximately 6,300 koban, staffed by the aforementioned average of three to
five officers throughout Japan; as well as approximately 6,600 residential police
boxes, usually housing one officer and their family).
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infrastructure. There are even police boxes spread throughout
neighborhoods in which retired officers can gather to socialize and
encourage community safety while being available for consultation,
and some police stations double as homes where police officers will
live with their families. 228 The Japanese koban model of
structurally-integrated community policing seems able to produce
positive consequences when compared to the United States’ police
system in regard to murder prevention and resolution. Murder rates
continue decreasing and are significantly lower in Japan (below 0.3,
compared to the United States rates presently-stabilized 5); murder
clearance rates are almost absolute (generally around 99% in Tokyo
and Osaka, while in New York they oscillate between 60 and 75%,
and in Boston, they don’t reach the 50% range);229 and incarceration
rates are significantly lower (with the United States housing the
world’s proportionally highest prison population with 655 prisoners
per 100,000 individuals, while Japan presents a rate of 41).230
The question then remains, as a standing inquiry to this
proposal: Why are the police in Japan so effective? Is it only because
of geographical dispersion and ubiquity? There are several answers
that could be utilized as counter-arguments to this thesis at a policy
level beyond exclusively culturalist arguments: (i) Are there more
police in Japan? (ii) Are Japanese police just better, when analyzed
through objective elements like training, funding, or equipment?
(iii) Are the police better paid in Japan? The answer to these three
questions is no.
There are more police per capita in the United States than in
Japan, a pattern that remains true in all of the cities analyzed in this
study. In 2017, the total police force in the United States was 956,941,
with 670,279 sworn officers. This is a rate of 339.4 officers per
See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150.
See NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 8. Clearance
Reports (2017-2020), N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reportsanalysis/clearance.page [https://perma.cc/5CY4-SJ5M] (last visited Apr. 24,
2019); 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150; HOMICIDE UNIT, BOSTON POLICE
DEP’T,
2017
HOMICIDE
YEAR
END
REPORT
(2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/5b50a07935
2f53585519bd03/1532010618077/2017+homicide+report.pdf
[perma.cc/9R3Z8PVJ]; National Clearance Data, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearance-browse-by/national-data
[https://perma.cc/62AC-AP2E].
230
This Paper does not analyze the relationship between effective policing
and incarceration. However, it is worth noting that another crucial, structural
difference between the United States’ and Japan’s law enforcement effects is their
incarceration rates.
228
229
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100,000 individuals.231 In Japan, the total police force amounts to
296,700 law enforcement employee for a ratio of 211.54 per 100,000
individuals—127.86 less per 100,000 or approximately 37% less total
force than in the United States. 232 And yet, murder prevention
effectiveness abruptly varies from below 0.3 murders per 100,000
people in Japan to approximately 5 in the United States. The total
law enforcement workforce in New York was 69,592—for a rate of
839.53 per 100,000 residents. 233 In Tokyo, the total police force was
comprised of 43,505, for a rate of 321.78—517.75 less per 100,000
residents, or approximately 62% less total force than New York.234
And yet murder rates in New York have stabilized in recent years in
rates just below 4 murders per 100,000 city inhabitants, while Tokyo
consistently averages below 0.7. In 2015, Boston had a total police
force of 2,899,235 which gave the city a ratio of 435.77 officers per
100,000 residents. By comparison, the Osaka Prefecture had a total
of 21,474 officers236 for 107.37 officers per 100,000 residents—328.4
less per 100,000 residents, or approximately 25% less total force than
231 Full-time Law Enforcement Employees, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crimein-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-74 [https://perma.cc/DL2B8F3W].
232 NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 8.
233 In New York, the uniformed police consist of 38,422 individuals, with a
support group of 12,170, and a civilian workforce of 19,000. THE COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE FINANCE DIVISION ON THE FISCAL 2018 PRELIMINARY
BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2017 PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 14, 2017), http://council.nyc.gov/
budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2017/03/056-NYPD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6545-83Z3]; About NYPD, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page
[https://perma.cc/3LPS-N5YF] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Full-time Law
Enforcement Employees, supra note 231.
234 NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 8; STATISTICS
BUREAU, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF
JAPAN (2017), https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2017all.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QUL7-2YML].
235
CITY OF BOSTON, 2015 WORKFORCE REPORT (2015), https://www.cityof
boston.gov/images_documents/2015.04.14%20Final%20Draft-UPDATED_City
%20of%20Boston%20Workforce%20Profile%20Report_tcm3-50873.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GZ63-ELNY].
236 Koban Index, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, supra note 104. See also Overview
of
Prefectural
Police
in
2018,
IWATE
PREFECTURAL
POLICE,
http://www2.pref.iwate.jp/~hp0802/oshirase/keimu/kenkeiyouran/000mokuji.
html [https://perma.cc/LZ4N-689Z]. Most of the police are gathered within Osaka
city, though the numbers include the prefecture.
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in Boston. Despite Boston having a higher number of police per
capita than Osaka, it records over 7 murders per 100,000 individuals,
contrasted by rates that stabilize around 0.5 in the Nippon city. In
every possible geographical scope of the analyzed entities, there is a
substantially larger police presence in the United States than there
is in Japan. It is, therefore, safe to assert that police number per
capita is generally higher in the United States as well as in the cities
analyzed and that the quantity of police does not equate to efficiency
in murder prevention since increasing the number of police officers
does not necessarily reduce murder rates.
With respect to training and prerequisites to access the police
profession, instruction and education preconditions are roughly
equal in both countries.237 Regarding funding and equipment, the
Japanese police receive substantially less dedicated funding, and do
not have the material resources available to U.S. law enforcement.
New York Police Department training is six months, 238 Boston’s
almost seven months,239 and Japan’s training takes a period of six
months.240 The recruitment prerequisites are also comparable and
include similar levels of essential prior education. 241 It is safe to
conclude, therefore, that the quantitative elements of training as well
as prior education requirements do not play a determinant
237
Though training time does not equate to training quality, it is not the
purpose of this Paper to evaluate the quality of police academy training; and in the
pursuit of avoiding potential bias towards any particular police structure, trainings
will be assumed to have the same quality.
238
Hiring Process: Requirements, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
nypd/careers/police-officers/po-hiring.page
[https://perma.cc/5MA3-7S5L]
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
239
How to Become a Police Officer, CITY BOS., https://www.boston.gov/
departments/police/how-become-police-officer [https://perma.cc/AAL3-RR3M]
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
240
Japanese training periods are nationally mandated and regulated.
Recruitment: Police, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa.go.jp/about/
recruitment/police/school/faq.html [https://perma.cc/78HC-N6GF] (last visited
Apr. 24, 2019).
241 In New York, candidates “must have earned 60 college credits with a
minimum 2.0 GPA from an accredited institution or 2 years of active military
service in the United States Armed Forces in order to be appointed to the title of
Police Officer.” In Boston, “[y]ou need to have a high school diploma or a GED
certificate. You can also satisfy this requirement with three years of military service
and an honorable discharge.” In Japan both university graduates and nongraduates can become police officers—university graduates will be trained for 6
months, and non-graduates will be trained for 10 months. See discussion and
sources cited supra notes 236-240.
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differential role in murder prevention. Pertaining to funding, in
2017 Japanese National Police received approximately $2.6 billion,
and the 47 prefectural police forces received national appropriations
of approximately $29.5 billion.242 That same year, the United States
spent an estimated $115 billion on police, and New York City
budgeted $5.6 billion for FY 2019—for a rate of $529 per N.Y.C.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department
resident. 243
appropriated 672,223,000,000 JPY (about $6.2 billion) in the initial
budget of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for Fiscal Year
2019—for a rate of $465 per capita (approximately 14% less than
N.Y.C. per resident).244 In 2017, the Boston Police Department was
allocated over $356 million of the city's budget—or $528.80 per
resident.245 The Osaka Prefectural Police Department appropriated
273,641,000,000 JPY (about $2.5 billion) in the initial budget of the
Osaka Prefectural Government for FY 2019—for an approximate
rate of $327.40 per capita (61.5% less than Boston per resident).246 In
242
NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 11 (noting the
yearly adjustment calculated with the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics “CPI
Inflation Calculator”).
243 Police and Corrections Expenditures, URB. INST., https://www.urban.org/
policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/stateand-local-backgrounders/police-and-corrections-expenditures
[https://perma.cc/T6HC-7JTY]; THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE
FINANCE DIVISION ON THE FISCAL 2019 PRELIMINARY BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2018
PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE NEW YORK POLICE
DEPARTMENT (Mar. 12, 2018), https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/
uploads/sites/54/2018/03/FY19-New-York-Police-Department.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZP7-D5KV].
244
TOKYO METRO. GOV’T, THE SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT INITIAL BUDGET OF THE
TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 131 (2019),
https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/syukei1/zaisei/20190125_heisei31
nendo_tokyotoyosanangaiyou/31yosanangaiyou.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QR988EP].
245
This is without taking into account incidentals like overtime, which can
amount to $60 million a year. Other Departments like Youth Engagement &
Employment or the Office of Arts & Culture received $6,058,544 and $1,349,436,
respectively.
CITY
OF
BOSTON,
SUMMARY
BUDGET
(2017),
https://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/02%20Summary%20Budget_
tcm3-53283.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV6N-RJNF]; Walsh Declares Racism Public
Health Crisis; Wants 20% of Boston Police OT Budget Reallocated, CBS BOSTON (June 12,
2020),
https://boston.cbslocal.com/2020/06/12/boston-police-budget-mayormarty-walsh/.
246
OSAKA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT, THE SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT INITIAL
BUDGET OF THE OSAKA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 12 (2019),
http://www.pref.osaka.lg.jp/attach/5163/00315394/shiryou1.pdf
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terms of equipment, the militarization of the police in the United
States has given it some of the most sophisticated and powerful tools
available for law enforcement and urban warfare, though murder
rate prevention results from a comparative perspective with Japan
do not seem to accompany or reflect the expenditure. Militarization
of the police is a phenomenon present in the United States, but
absent in Japan, and which does not seem to contribute positively to
murder prevention.247
Finally, payment and remuneration of officers does not have a
necessary tie to the quality of law enforcement, though it is a
question worth exploring. Salaries of officers in both countries are
complex to compare due to adjusted cost of living, variability
between lower and higher rank remuneration, and the potentially
diverging sociocultural conceptualization of money and its value.
However, by the numbers alone, Japanese police officers seem to get

[https://perma.cc/XCY2-PWJ7]. In addition, some of the expenditure of each
prefectural police listed in Article 37, Clause 1 of the Police Act are paid from the
budget of the Central Government. These include the expenditure for education in
police academies, for police telecommunications, for crime statistics, for security
dedicated to specific locations and VIPs, for investigations of special crime, and
other similar matters. The itemized statement of the Budget of the Central
Government does not distinguish the amount from the expenditure of the National
Police Agency. L. CRAIG PARKER JR., THE JAPANESE POLICE SYSTEM TODAY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 32 (2001); Summary of the Restructuring
of the Police, Circular issued from the Deputy Director General of the NPA to Chiefs
of the Prefectural Police Headquarters, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY (March 4, 2000),
http://www.npa.go.jp/pub_docs/index.htmS; NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF
JAPAN, supra note 137, at 4-8 (detailing the prefectural, local, and national structure
of police organization in Japan).
247 Police militarization may be a policy response due to a perceived need to
compete in an “arms-race” of sorts with equally armed individuals committing
crime, which calls into question matters of civilian firearm regulation. See generally
Scott W. Phillips, Police Militarization, FBI: L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/police-militarization
[https://perma.cc/9UNC-YW3X]; Nsikan Akpan, Police Militarization Fails to
Protect Officers and Targets Black Communities, Study Finds, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 21,
2018),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/police-militarization-fails-toprotect-officers-and-targets-black-communities-study-finds
[https://perma.cc/RU6A-8UG8]; Tom Jacobs, The Militarization of Police Does Not
Reduce Crime, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 20, 2018), https://psmag.com/socialjustice/militarization-of-police-does-not-reduce-crime [https://perma.cc/AXM43DDF]; RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S
POLICE FORCES (2013); MIKE DAVIS, FORTRESS LOS ANGELES: THE MILITARIZATION OF
URBAN SPACE (2017); Sam Bieler, Police Militarization in the USA: the State of the Field,
39 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 586-600 (2016).
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paid a comparatively lesser amount than law enforcement in the
United States.248
With significantly less total force numbers, equal quantitative
amounts of training and formal education prerequisites, less overall
budget, less militarized equipment, and seemingly more limited pay
structures, murder rates in Japan remain lower than those in the
United States. Without any other inferences and subject to other
socioeconomic and legal conditions, these facts appear to indicate
higher efficiency in Japan’s murder-prevention strategies. The key
measurable difference between both nations’ police structures
appears to be their geographical presence. The solution to the
United States murder problem could lay not in increasing the
resources given to the police, but in geographically reorganizing the
police more effectively to establish police presence as an integrated
element of the communities they serve. In doing so, there is an
underlying social functionality that may reconceptualize the police’s
purpose—preventing crime and building the social and
infrastructural fabric of community-policing.249 This is not a thesis
248
In N.Y.C., officers have a starting base rate salary of $42,500 and a median
salary after five years of $85,292. Added with other benefits like paid vacation,
longevity pay, night differentials and overtime, the NY.P.D. asserts officers can
make over $100,000 per year. In Boston, an average salary (without any of the
compensations) amounts to $47,076.96, but some officers can make above $250,000
or even $300,000. Tokyo police officers receive a salary—depending on rank and
experience—that ranges between $12,000 starting and $60,000 (164,600jpy/month535,400jpy/month).
Salary and Benefits, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/nypd/careers/police-officers/po-benefits.page
[https://perma.cc/PL6BJCBP] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Compensation Rates: Municipal Police Officers,
BOSTON POLICE DEP’T, https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/mp2_
salplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFK-CAFV] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Salary
Information for City of Boston Jobs, CITY BOS., https://www.boston.gov/
departments/human-resources/salary-information-city-boston-jobs
[https://perma.cc/4P2D-D6DY] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); PERS. COMM’N TOKYO
METROPOLITAN GOV’T,
PUBLIC SECURITY PERSONNEL SALARY TABLE,
http://www.saiyou.metro.tokyo.jp/pdf/23kankoku/2312kyuuryou/23_bessi2_b
ekki/23_bekki1_02_kouan.pdf [https://perma.cc/L68Z-SLX3] (last visited Apr.
17, 2019); Boston Detective Rakes in $400K, Other City Employees Top $300K,
BOSTON25NEWS (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.boston25news.com/news/bostondetective-rakes-in-400k-other-employees-top-300k-/494042149/
[https://perma.cc/AN7J-FAAQ].
249
There are, among other disparities, infrastructural barriers to an unaltered
implementation of the koban model in the United States. The main infrastructural
criticism would be that the United States tends to be less densely populated than
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that calls for a necessary increase in resources dedicated to police
efforts, but instead calls for a more efficient allocation of them.
The modern iteration of the koban system appeared in 1874,
coinciding with the creation of the Metropolitan Police Department
as a manner in which to increase police presence at a microlocational level.250 Despite their prolonged history, these structural
components of Japan’s police governance have been able to adapt
their community purpose to the passing of the times, and appear to
have carried significant efficiency momentum in crime and murder
Japan, and that the success of the Japanese koban model would only function in
densely-populated areas. However, there is reason to believe the model is effective
outside densely-populated areas. The koban system is deployed throughout Japan
with equal (or more) success than in Osaka and Tokyo; two cities that account for
most of the population and murders in Japan. This seems to indicate that the
success of the koban model is not reliant on, or at least does not exclusively attend
to, affectations related to population density. Furthermore, this Paper does not
endorse a direct transplant of the model without modification, but encourages a
tailored adaptation accounting for divergences between the two nations. General
population density inside U.S. cities (about 1,600 p.mi²) is significantly greater than
that of unincorporated areas (about 35 p.mi²); compared with the average Japanese
average population density of almost 900 p.mi². Though perhaps not expandable
to the entirety of the United States, or even to every section of every city,
infrastructural and resource distribution conclusions found in this contrastive
study are a useful framework from which to comprehend true community-policing,
and a preventive (and not punitive) approach to murder. Darryl Cohen,
Understanding Population Density, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2015/03/
understanding-population-density.html
[https://perma.cc/2D8Q-RB87];
DEMOGRAPHIA,
DEMOGRAPHIA
WORLD
URBAN
AREAS
23
(2020),
http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJS2-6YSW].
250
“Koban,” the Japanese Policing System Spreading Across the Globe, TOKYO
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T (2019), https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/
smph/multilingual/english/about_us/activity/koban.html
[https://perma.cc/LU4R-9JDW]; "Koban" in New York City?, CONSULATE GEN.
JAPAN
N.Y.
(2016),
https://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/japaninfo/
spring2016/04.html [https://perma.cc/ST7W-36FW]; Koban and Residential Police
Box as a Symbol of Safe and Secure Environment of Your Community, KANAGAWA
https://www.police.pref.kanagawa.jp/eng/e_mes/
PREFECTURAL
POLICE,
engg0001.htm [https://perma.cc/J2KZ-Z5YP]; Japanese Community Police and Police
Box System, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa.go.jp/english/keidai/
Guidelines_of_Police_Policy/JapaneseCommunityPolice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92SM-ZKD2]; Koban (Police Box), SHIZUOKA PREFECTURAL POLICE
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.pref.shizuoka.jp/police/english/duty/koban.html
[https://perma.cc/Z96Y-HTTV]; Frank Leishman, Koban: Neighbourhood Policing in
Contemporary Japan, POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 196 (2007); Nicholas D. Kristof, A
Neighborly
Style
of
Police
State,
N.Y. TIMES
(June
4,
1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/04/weekinreview/the-world-a-neighborlystyle-of-police-state.html [https://perma.cc/UP76-T3NQ]; Tom Ellis et al., Japanese
Community Policing Under the Microscope, in THE HANDBOOK OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED
POLICING (Tom Williamson ed., 2008).
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prevention. The koban superstructure is projected to maintain an
idea of permanence, integration, and trust between the community
and the officers who serve them, and reinforces the legitimacy of the
police and police activity within neighborhoods. The Japanese
National Police Agency goes as far as to name the koban “the center
of community policing,” grounded on the concepts of cooperative
crime prevention and deterrence.251 Its overarching purpose is to go
beyond crime reactiveness and pursue prevention through
integrative community-building and relationship-building. As
such, police interactions include, for example, conducting jyunkairenraku, which are routine visits to residences and businesses, to
listen to residents’ concerns, and take potential suggestions from
community members with the intent of creating community
cohesion founded on relationships of identity and trust.252 While
under United States notions of police-relations these interactions
with the citizenry may seem an intrusion on individual freedoms, 253
Japan perceives this social intertwining as an advancement of
community relations beneficial to both agents. For the police, as
service-providers of safety, it is a dynamic through which to
251 Japanese Community Police and Police Box System, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY,
http://www.npa.go.jp/english/keidai/Guidelines_of_Police_Policy/JapaneseCo
mmunityPolice.pdf [https://perma.cc/92SM-ZKD2].
252
Id. (noting that police sponsor community outreach activities, among other
actions).
253
Though a connotation of the police ubiquity proposal put forth in this
Paper may be that it is limiting individual freedoms, most freedom ranking
organizations recognize that Japan guarantees very similar human and interactive
freedoms for its citizens as the United States does. Freedom House in its 2020
review, gave Japan a total freedom score of 96 (with a disaggregated score of 40 in
political rights and 56 in civil liberties), whereas the United States received a score
of 86 (scoring 33 in political rights, and 53 in civil liberties). According to this D.C.based ranking, the United States is therefore 11.63% less free than Japan. All in all,
it seems that the existence of (i) integrative socioeconomic policies and (ii) conflictresolution resource ubiquity policies in Japan does not imply in any way a
reduction in freedoms or pursuable liberties as a consequence to its legal
frameworks. See Countries and Territories, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedom
house.org/countries/freedom-world/scores
[https://perma.cc/9M8J-YCNW]
(last visited June 15, 2020); SARAH REPUCCI, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD
2020: A LEADERLESS STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY (2020), https://freedomhouse.org/
sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G43K-EM2N]. See generally IAN VÁSQUEZ & TANJA PORČNIK,
CATO INST., THE HUMAN FREEDOM INDEX 2019 (2019) (giving the United States a
“personal freedoms” score of 8.72 (compared to Japan’s 8.70) and a “safety from
homicide” score of 7.9 (2 full points below Japan’s 9.9)); “Koban” in New York City?,
CONSULATE GEN. JAPAN N.Y. (2016), https://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/
japaninfo/spring2016/04.html [https://perma.cc/ST7W-36FW].
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promote community cohesion; and to individual members of the
community, as end-users of said safety, it is a channel through
which to see their interests addressed and guaranteed.
As a result of this careful policy design, police officers are
expected to become active and recognizable community members
with deep ties connecting them to those they provide services to. It
appears that the underlying intent of the koban system is that of
dispelling the conceptualization of the police force as an extraneous
and foreign imposition of conflict-resolution and reverting it to
deliver a user-centered service. Despite recent local efforts in the
United States to build community-policing structures, exemplified
by New York’s “build the block” or “neighborhood policing”
initiatives, there is still the fracturing element of infrastructural
distribution of police resources standing between both nations’
strategies for murder prevention. This fracture impedes U.S. police
networks from integrating into neighborhoods in the manner that
the koban system allows for. It is worth noting, for the purposes of
policy translatability, that since Singapore shifted its policing
strategy from an incident-centered reactive system like the one
currently present in the United States, to a police governance
structure modelled after the koban, homicide rates have consistently
declined on the island from around 2.5 per 100,000 individuals, to
the current rate of 0.21.254
Another key differential element between the United States and
Japan, which may be tied to the integration of police into the
communities they serve, is that of killings perpetrated by the police
within the exercise of police powers. Though state killings fall
beyond the scope of this Paper, it is worthwhile to briefly address
the potential link between community policing, the concept of
legitimate policing, and police killings. One of the key foundational
principles that underlies the purpose and legitimacy of the police is
that of maintaining peace, order, and security through the
enforcement of law, which includes the prevention of killings. But
in some instances, the use of force on behalf of the state under the
pretext of maintaining said peace concludes in the commission of a
254
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE:
HOMICIDE TRENDS, PATTERNS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 37-38 (2019),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YJL-UAJS]; Ambassador of Japan to Singapore Makoto
Yamanaka, Opening Ceremony of the International Seminar on “The Community
Policing Strategies Evolving from the Koban System of Japan and the NPC System
of
Singapore”
(Aug.
17,
2009),
https://www.sg.emb-japan.go.jp/
bi_KOBNSpeech_09.htm [https://perma.cc/V34F-HBRU].
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killing by police officers in the line of duty. In the United States,
police killings generally amount to approximately 1,000 per year.255
In Japan, police killings are near non-existent. Official criminal
statistics published by the National Police Agency report on
murders committed by all public servants of national, prefectural,
and local governments and administrations. These include all
individuals involved in all local and national legislative, judiciary,
and executive bodies, including prefectural and national police
departments. Whereas in 2018, the United States saw approximately
1,000 police killings, in Japan there were a total of 7 killings
committed by all public servants. 256 In 2015 Japan saw 4 killings
perpetrated by public servants and 3 killings in 2016 and 2017; these
patterns hold steady throughout the last decade. 257 Within these
255
With the FBI reporting about 400 as justifiable homicides yearly, which in
2019 represented 1.16 state killings per million people in New York, and 0.74 in
Massachusetts. Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/
[https://perma.cc/RQR5U5W2] (last updated June 15, 2020); Expanded Homicide Data Table 5: Justifiable
Homicide
by
Weapon,
Law
Enforcement,
2012-2016,
FBI:
UCR,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/
expanded-homicide-data-table-5.xls [https://perma.cc/9P9E-M2Z4].
256
Consultations with sources from the Japanese N.P.A. and the Ministry of
Justice revealed that these public institutions do not publish the specific statistics of
the number of murders by public servants broken down by administrative body or
agency. This prevents the public from knowing exactly the number of murders
carried out by police officers from the government-provided statistics. This
information is instead inferred from private publications. See N.P.A., Criminal
Statistics in 2018, https://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/soubunkan/h30/h30hanza
itoukei.htm; RESEARCH GROUP ON FOREIGN SYSTEMS, Research on Safety and Police
Activities in the United States, ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF SECURITY SCIENCE,
Paper Series No. 96, 2017, at 5, fn. 9; RESEARCH GROUP ON FOREIGN SYSTEMS IN THE
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF SECURITY SCIENCE, Research on Safety and Police
Activities in the U.S. (Association for the Study of Security Science Paper Series No.
96, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5PRJ-63LZ]; Murder by a Handsome Macho Police
Officer, SANKEI NEWS (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.sankei.com/west/
news/151225/wst1512250008-n2.html [https://perma.cc/LVM5-ZLRW]; Criminal
Statistics in 2018: Numbers of Arrested Public Servant, per Year, per Crime, NAT’L POLICE
AGENCY,
https://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/soubunkan/h30/excel/H30_130.xls
[https:/perma.cc/X8MK-EF5G]; Criminal Statistics in 2013: Numbers of Arrested
Public Servant, per Year, per Crime, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, https://www.npa.go.jp/
toukei/soubunkan/h25/excel/H25_131.xls
[https://perma.cc/Y2ME-JJ33];
Criminal Statistics in 2008: Numbers of Arrested Public Servant, per Year, per Crime,
NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, https://www.npa.go.jp/archive/toukei/keiki/h20/
Excel/H20_132.xls [https://perma.cc/TD9M-SZ7Q].
257 Police killings have occurred in 1978, 1983, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2014 (one case
per year), and 2015, 2018 (two cases). See 19-yr-old Police Officer Shoots Colleague
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killings, those committed by the police in their acts of service tend
to be zero, and are an extraordinarily rare occurrence rather than a
norm. Since 1978, there have only been ten total reported cases of
killings ascribed to incumbent police officers and the majority of
them appear to not have been in the line of duty. 258 Far from
idealizing a direct translation of the koban system to the United
States, what seems undeniable is that the United States’ police
structure, which may have been useful as a policy answer to a
different time in which law enforcement needed congregative
militarized structures for the administration of “law and order,”
now seems to have exhausted its applicability under the same
patterns and poses a set of challenges both for citizen and officer.
The koban integrated model appears to suggest that if police
resources are deployed more precisely and equitably, they can
function more efficiently as a murder-inhibiting agent. It can be
derived from this comparative analysis that the potential of the
police as a force for murder prevention and community-building
can be more effectively utilized if conflict-resolution dynamics are
designed to be integrated within our communities like they are in
Japan by way of the koban system. It may be complex for citizens to
ascribe legitimacy to a militarized police force constituted by
individuals that do not belong to the community they serve just as
it may be complex for the police officers to maintain order and
justice. This Paper does not intend to suggest that a koban-style
approach to geographical allocation of police resources would imply
an amelioration of this critical situation in the United States. 259
However, it is worth noting that Japan, a country which pursues
permanent police presence by way of the koban model has
significantly less state killings than the United States, where (i) the
Dead in Western Japan, KYODO NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://english.
kyodonews.net/news/2018/04/f9b192050330-police-officer-shot-dead-possiblyby-missing-colleague.html [https://perma.cc/J74R-Y4TG]; Police Officer in Koban
Stabbed to Death in Sendai; Attacker Shot Dead, JAPAN TODAY (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://japantoday.com/category/crime/police-officer-in-koban-stabbed-todeath-in-sendai-attacker-shot-dead. See also Murder by a Handsome Macho Police
Officer, supra note 256; Criminal Statistics in 2018: Numbers of Arrested Public Servant,
per Year, per Crime, supra note 256.
258
See generally sources cited supra notes 256, 257.
259
As previously stated, the indicator of police killings may be closely tied to
the effects of community policing on police forces and the neighborhoods they
pursue their state functions in. However, this Paper is deferential with the
determinism of this connection, and does not make absolute claims regarding its
certainty, as it recognizes that it may be linked to other complex, overlapping, and
nuanced sociocultural and socioeconomic factors, bases, and inferences.
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geo-allocation of police resources may create a dislodging rift
between law enforcement and the citizens they serve, and (ii) where
socioeconomic divides amongst neighborhoods are more
pronounced. Perhaps, as a consequence to a koban-style mode of
policing, people would cease to see a division between the police
and the community and see law enforcement as members of the
community providing the service of safety as they do in Japan.
This Paper does not call for a direct emulation of the koban
system, regardless of whether this is a model that has had
objectively positive results in Japan. This Paper instead proposes
that it is the underlying principles of the koban system that make for
an efficient crime prevention strategy in general, and a targeted
murder prevention strategy specifically. This latent essence is found
in the integration and identity between social and legal norms
necessary for maintaining stability and peace across communities,
and those individuals who provide the service of their enforcement.
In subscribing to the nature of these systems, this Paper proposes
the pursuit of a redistribution of the conceptualization of law
enforcement power dynamics and criminal retribution. It proposes
a reimagining of social conflict resolution at a micro-level that
reconstructs systems of post-criminal punitive action, replacing
them with systems of preventive, community-centered, and
integrated justice distribution. Perhaps this may take the form of a
koban system adopted in Japan, where police officers are active,
integrated, and identifiable actors within their community. Or
perhaps it may take the form of local social councils directed at
restorative justice rather than punitive retribution, as an aprioristic
measure to the involvement of the traditional justice system; paired
with a tightening of the reins of accountability regarding abuses of
authority, and a reconceptualization of social services as murder
prevention strategies. Or perhaps it is a combination of all these
policies or their interlacing with other systemic alternatives—
always anchored to become an effective and culturally-adapted
conversion of a redistribution and reconstruction of power nuclei
between the police and the citizenry. In essence, the system to cure
the present inefficiencies of U.S. police dynamics may be inspired by
the principles of redistribution of justice administration and peacekeeping resources to ensure non-arbitrary and non-violent results
and allow communities to feel like the order system is established
for and by its citizens, integrated within their communities, and not
an application of extraneous foreign force which may carry with it
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the implied risk of ending in death. This is fundamentally what the
koban system provides to the Japanese society: an equal and
disperse distribution of community-focused resources which
concludes in the social integration of the administration of justice
and order, and the provision of safety as a community resource. The
koban system, as other analogous community-focused and
integrated peace-keeping systems do, allows for social conflict
resolution to occur prior to the criminal conduct through the
creation of tight-knit and cohesive social structures interwoven with
their safety-enforcement systems. This may be a fundamental pillar
of the Japanese success at criminal deterrence and an integral
component to its comparative efficiency at preventing murder.
This Paper does not intend to establish the claim that community
policing would cure all the inefficiencies and complexities endemic
to the U.S. police system. Nonetheless, it is a path forward, and a
positive start to a conversation that regards safety as a community
service. Reformulating murder as a public goods issue pushes us to
understand communities as consumers of safety and the police as
due providers of said safety. Integrated relations would benefit
community members as the “end-user” of safety, as well as those
who are to provide and distribute the public service. As consumers
and financiers of the safety public good, communities have the right
to redesign and redefine the nature of the product provided to them.
As far as taxpayers invest in peace-keeping services for the purpose
of social safety as the foundational legitimating principle of the
police force, this includes the reasonable prevention of killings.
Taxpayers thus deserve that their contributions to capitalizing the
police are transparent and that the peace services provided are as
efficient, accountable in their execution, and consumer-focused as
they can be. In Japan this is achieved with less human capital and
less dedicated monetary resources, resulting in less murders by way
of the koban system. Japan has almost 40% less law enforcement
employees per capita than the United States, their murder clearance
rates are higher by an almost 40% differential (and near-absolute),
and murder rates in the Nippon nation are 26.5 times smaller. These
facts perhaps dispel the notion that more capital investment and
more police necessarily equate more safety from murder. This
information also pushes us to look deeper into the foundational
principles of our police forces as well as the socioeconomic causality
of homicide, and question how to formulate systems that may more
efficiently prevent murder.
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Japan has uncovered a competitive advantage over other nations
in murder prevention and resolution. Though the underlying
causes for the country’s success at almost eradicating murder may
be deeply rooted in culturally-charged values, those are complex to
model and transplant to other nations. Cultural deontology cannot
easily be observed, removed, and adapted from one society to
another. However, it is possible to emulate techniques of success
and, in that regard, follow in the footsteps of Japan’s address of
murder as a social issue. This Paper does not propose a direct and
universal transplant of Japan’s policies into the United States.
Instead it acknowledges that there are lessons to be learned in the
principles that inform and inspire them. This Paper proposes an
adaptation of the notions derived from Japan’s success in murder
prevention, and encourages the pursuit of reform in United States
regulatory framework attending to U.S.’ capacities and necessities,
without sacrificing fundamental American freedoms and liberties.260
This could be achieved in the United States by (i) enacting policies
that seek to reduce and disassociate socioeconomic inequality from
strict geospatial demarcations, and (ii) reallocating police and other
safety and conflict-resolution resources to make them universally
available, socially integrated, and community-focused in the style of
the koban.

260

See discussion supra note 253.
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